“— When and to whom will the copper mine in Armenia be sold? Will the group make a profit from the deal?
— In June 2026, the deal to sell 100% of VTB Bank’s claims against Teghut CJSC was closed. As a result of the transaction, the loan previously extended to Teghut from the balance sheet of our subsidiary bank in Armenia [VTB Bank (Armenia) CJSC] was also fully repaid. The buyer was a group of international investors. The financial result for the bank in 2026 from this transaction is positive, and the profit from exiting the asset, including income previously received in the first half of the year, will amount to approximately 4 billion rubles [∼ USD 51M].”
Thus we can be sure that the key financial settlement for the deal occurred a month before the SPA deal — in the period between June 8, 2026 (the date of Armenia’s parliamentary elections) and June 30, 2026 (before the interview was given on July 1, 2026). It was during this window that the buyer of the debt made the full cash settlement for the purchase of TEGHUT CJSC’s debt from VTB Bank.
Let us draw attention to the phrasing of First Deputy Chairman of VTB Bank: “profit from exiting the asset, including income previously received in the first half of the year.” This means that the $51 million includes, apparently, certain current income that VTB received from the mine in the first half of 2026. In 2024, Teghut’s revenue was $144 million (at an average annual exchange rate of ~390 AMD/USD). For half a year, this amounts to roughly $72 million — of course, salaries, taxes, and other operating expenses were paid out of this sum, so the bank’s actual “income” would have been lower. Nevertheless, the very fact of this inclusion does not allow us to treat the $51 million as purely profit from the sale of the debt — part of this sum had already been generated by the enterprise itself while it was under VTB’s control. Therefore, the exact price of the transaction remains unknown, and our preliminary estimate of $100–150 million still appears realistic.
This brings us to the central question that remains unanswered: which international bank was brave — or reckless — enough to facilitate a cash settlement of hundreds of millions of dollars with a sanctioned Russian bank, fully aware of the risks of secondary sanctions?
Media reports, led by Azatutyun (RFE/RL), have named Konstantin Sokolov — a US-based investor and head of TRIPP+ — as the architect and public face of the transaction. But as a US citizen or US-connected investor, Sokolov would have been acutely aware of the legal exposure involved in any transaction with a sanctioned entity like VTB. The question is not just who bought the debt — but which financial institution was willing to process the payment, knowing the consequences.
Did Sokolov personally take that risk? Or did he rely on a local intermediary — a “KUPRAR RA-2” with its own nominee beneficial owner, a “Virabyan-2” — to carry the operational burden while he remained the strategic frontman?
What we can say with confidence is that the debt was purchased by a separate entity, not KUPRAR RA. KUPRAR RA was a later construct, used to obtain legal title to the asset after the debt had already been cleared. That much is clear. But how the transaction was structured, who financed it, and who ultimately bore the financial and legal risk — these questions remain open, and are the subject of our ongoing thoughts.
Tigran Markosyan — signatory of the Decision, Temporary Acting Chairman, Member of the Competition and Consumer Protection Commission of the Republic of Armenia.
To complete the share purchase, the transaction required approval from the Commission for the Protection of Competition and Consumer Interests of the Republic of Armenia, which issued its decision on July 7, 2026. During the approval process, the beneficial owner of Kuprar RA was entrepreneur Sergey Virabyan, who — according to media reports — sold the company to Sokolov’s U.S. company immediately after the commission’s decision. As we previously noted, based on KPMG’s 2024 audit, Teghut CJSC has negative equity (with a charter capital of just 3.1 million AMD ≈ $3,221), rendering its shares essentially valueless, which suggests the share purchase agreement was largely nominal in nature.
Note: All companies involved in the transaction are closed joint-stock companies. This means that information about their shareholders is not available in the public register — the Electronic System of the State Register of Legal Entities of the Ministry of Justice (https://e-register.moj.am/) — but is maintained by the Central Depository of Armenia (https://cda.am/en), and is not publicly accessible. It is important to note that while the current public registry profile for mining operatorTeghout CJSC still shows the pre-transaction beneficial owners (such as VTB Bank and its partners), this is a matter of legal timing. Under Armenian law, companies have a 40-day window to update their Real Owners Declaration following a change of control. Check TEGHUT BO Declaration here: https://e-register.moj.am/en/companies/39193721/declarations/7c9191c2-1273-451e-bc28-b0545abc029c.
We have reviewed the official document of the Commission for the Protection of Competition and Consumer Interests of the Republic of Armenia — Decision No. 269-A of July 7, 2026, obtained via the portal ef.competition.am.
What the document reveals.The content is striking in its opacity. Nearly all significant sections — from the size of the acquired stake to the ownership structure and financial indicators of the parties — are fully redacted, replaced with █[REDACTED]█. The only certainty we can extract from the document is the fact of concentration: Kuprar RA CJSC acquired some stake in the charter capital of Teghut CJSC. Everything else remains outside the public domain, making any substantive analysis of the transaction impossible based on this document alone.
This is a classic example of a formal public approval that provides minimal information, leaving researchers with little more than speculation.
Notably, according to our information, both Sergey Virabyan and Tigran Markosyan previously worked at Ardshinbank (formerly Ardshininvestbank) at different times, as well as within the Armenian government.
Below, we publish our English translation of Decision.
PAGE 1
REPUBLIC OF ARMENIA COMMISSION FOR THE PROTECTION OF COMPETITION AND CONSUMER INTERESTS
DECISION 7 July 2026, No. 269-A Yerevan
ON PERMITTING THE CONCENTRATION OF “KUPRAR RA” CLOSED JOINT-STOCK COMPANY AND “TEGHUT” CLOSED JOINT-STOCK COMPANY
The Commission for the Protection of Competition and Consumer Interests (hereinafter also referred to as the Commission), at its session on July 7, 2026, discussing the issue of permitting the concentration of “Kuprar RA” Closed Joint-Stock Company (hereinafter also referred to as the “Kuprar RA” Company) and “Teghut” Closed Joint-Stock Company (hereinafter also referred to as the “Teghut” Company),
HAS ESTABLISHED:
1. Brief description of the proceeding: The “Kuprar RA” Company submitted an application to the Commission on June 11, 2026, and the “Teghut” Company submitted an application on June 12, 2026, requesting permission for the notifiable concentration. According to the submitted applications, the “Kuprar RA” Company plans to acquire █[REDACTED]█ of the charter capital of the “Teghut” Company.
Based on the applications of the “Kuprar RA” and “Teghut” companies, a proceeding to assess the concentration was initiated in accordance with the procedure established by law (hereinafter also referred to as the Proceeding).
PAGE 2
2. Documents and other information requested and obtained by the Commission:
1) Regarding “Kuprar RA” Closed Joint-Stock Company: According to the information submitted to the Commission, “Kuprar RA” Company was founded on February 6, 2026, and is █[REDACTED]█.
The █[REDACTED]█ percentage share of the charter capital of “Kuprar RA” Company belongs to “█[REDACTED]█” Limited Liability Company (hereinafter also referred to as “█[REDACTED]█” Company).
According to the information submitted to the Commission, █[REDACTED]█.
The █[REDACTED]█ percentage share of the charter capital of “█[REDACTED]█” Company belongs to a physical person: █[REDACTED]█.
The value of the assets of “█[REDACTED]█” Company for the financial year 2025 amounted to █[REDACTED]█.
PAGE 3
The value of the assets of “Kuprar RA” Company as of the date of submitting the declaration amounted to █[REDACTED]█ AMD, and the amount of revenue was █[REDACTED]█ AMD.
According to the information submitted to the Commission, █[REDACTED]█.
PAGE 4
2) Regarding “Teghut” Closed Joint-Stock Company: The “Teghut” Company was registered on May 22, 2006, and carries out the production and sale of copper ore and concentrates, and molybdenum concentrate. The █[REDACTED]█ percentage share of the charter capital of “Teghut” Company belongs to █[REDACTED]█.
PAGE 5
The ownership chain of “Teghut” Company: █[REDACTED]█.
The value of the assets of “Teghut” Company as of the end of 2025 amounted to 97,366,219,000 AMD, and the amount of revenue was 63,355,054,000 AMD.
The value of the assets of “Teghut” Company as of May 31, 2026, amounted to █[REDACTED]█ AMD, equity capital was █[REDACTED]█ AMD, and liabilities amounted to █[REDACTED]█ AMD.
The volume of copper ores and concentrates produced by “Teghut” Company during 2025 amounted to █[REDACTED]█ net metric tons (չմտ), and the volume of molybdenum concentrate was █[REDACTED]█ net metric tons (չմտ).
PAGE 6
3) Regarding the proposed transaction: According to the applications submitted by “Kuprar RA” and “Teghut” companies, “Kuprar RA” Company plans to acquire █[REDACTED]█ percentage share of the charter capital of “Teghut” Company.
The ownership chain of “Teghut” Company after the Transaction: █[REDACTED]█.
According to information submitted by “Kuprar RA” Company on July 2, 2026, as soon as “Kuprar RA” Company becomes a shareholder of “Teghut” Company, it intends to ensure stable and socially responsible management of “Teghut” Company, in particular: █[REDACTED]█.
PAGE 7
4) Regarding the study conducted by the Commission: According to the results of the study of the mining sector conducted by the Commission, regarding the activities of “Teghut” Company, it should be noted that the company was registered on 22.05.2006, but the actual operation of the mine started in 2015, carrying out the production and sale of copper ore and concentrates, and molybdenum concentrate.
The study of the mining sector showed that the dynamics of the change in gross added value in the mining industry and open-pit mining was mainly conditioned by the operation of the Teghut deposit, and with the suspension of its operations, the sector’s share in GDP decreased.
According to information available in the EITI (Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative) publications (eiti.am):
In 2022, copper ores and concentrates were produced in the Republic of Armenia by:
In the domestic market, “Teghut” Company sold 9,901 net metric tons (չմտ) of copper ores and concentrates and 392 net metric tons (չմտ) of molybdenum concentrate, while “Zangezur Copper-Molybdenum Combine” Closed Joint-Stock Company sold 280 net metric tons (թմտ) of molybdenum concentrate.
In 2022, “Zangezur Copper-Molybdenum Combine” Closed Joint-Stock Company exported 243,367 net metric tons (թմտ) of copper ores and concentrates and 8,041 net metric tons (թմտ) of molybdenum concentrate; “Agarak Copper-Molybdenum Combine” Closed Joint-Stock Company exported 52,189.2 tons of copper ores and concentrates and 894.6 tons of molybdenum concentrate; “Teghut” Company exported 11,744 net metric tons (չմտ) of copper ores and concentrates; and “Akhtala Mining and Processing Combine” Closed Joint-Stock Company exported 8,325 net metric tons (թմտ) of copper ores and concentrates.
In 2023, copper ores and concentrates were produced by:
In the domestic market, “Teghut” Company sold 15,779 net metric tons (չմտ) of copper ores and concentrates and 146 net metric tons (չմտ) of molybdenum concentrate; “Zangezur Copper-Molybdenum Combine” Closed Joint-Stock Company sold 1,380 net metric tons (թմտ) of molybdenum concentrate; and “Agarak Copper-Molybdenum Combine” Closed Joint-Stock Company sold 711.1 tons of molybdenum concentrate.
In 2023, “Zangezur Copper-Molybdenum Combine” Closed Joint-Stock Company exported 203,367 net metric tons (թմտ) of copper ores and concentrates and 8,042 net metric tons (թմտ) of molybdenum concentrate; “Agarak Copper-Molybdenum Combine” Closed Joint-Stock Company exported 50,968.1 tons of copper ores and concentrates; “Teghut” Company exported 38,617 net metric tons (չմտ) of copper ores and concentrates; and “Akhtala Mining and Processing Combine” Closed Joint-Stock Company exported 9,150 net metric tons (թմտ) of copper ores and concentrates.
PAGE 9
According to the information submitted to the Commission by “Teghut” Company, during 2025, the volume of copper ores and concentrates produced by “Teghut” Company amounted to █[REDACTED]█ net metric tons (չմտ), and the volume of molybdenum concentrate was █[REDACTED]█ net metric tons (չմտ).
3. As a result of a comprehensive, complete, and objective discussion of the case, the Commission considers the following factual circumstances established:
“Kuprar RA” Company was founded on February 6, 2026, and is █[REDACTED]█.
The █[REDACTED]█ percentage share of the charter capital of “Kuprar RA” Company belongs to “█[REDACTED]█” Company.
The “█[REDACTED]█” Company (█[REDACTED]█) was founded on August 14, 2025, and carries out █[REDACTED]█.
The █[REDACTED]█ percentage share of the charter capital of “█[REDACTED]█” Company belongs to a physical person: █[REDACTED]█.
The value of the assets of “█[REDACTED]█” Company for the financial year 2025 amounted to █[REDACTED]█.
█[REDACTED]█.
PAGE 10
█[REDACTED]█.
The value of the assets of “Kuprar RA” Company as of the date of submitting the declaration amounted to █[REDACTED]█ AMD, and the amount of revenue was █[REDACTED]█ AMD.
█[REDACTED]█.
█[REDACTED]█.
PAGE 11
“Teghut” Company was registered on May 22, 2006, and carries out the production and sale of copper ore and concentrates, and molybdenum concentrate.
The █[REDACTED]█ percentage share of the charter capital of “Teghut” Company belongs to █[REDACTED]█.
The assets of “Teghut” Company as of the end of 2025 amounted to 97,366,219,000 AMD, and the amount of revenue was 63,355,054,000 AMD.
The volume of copper ores and concentrates produced by “Teghut” Company during 2025 amounted to █[REDACTED]█ net metric tons (չմտ), and the volume of molybdenum concentrate was █[REDACTED]█ net metric tons (չմտ).
PAGE 12
█[REDACTED]█.
█[REDACTED]█.
█[REDACTED]█.
4. As a result of the study and analysis of the factual circumstances of the proceeding and the relevant legal norms, the Commission concludes the following:
According to Part 1, Point 4 of Article 13 of the Law “On the Protection of Economic Competition” (hereinafter also referred to as the Law), the concentration of economic entities is considered to be the acquisition by an economic entity of a share in another economic entity registered in the Republic of Armenia, if this in itself constitutes at least 20 percent of the charter (pooled) capital of that economic entity, or if together with the share already owned by the acquirer, it constitutes at least 20 percent of the charter (pooled) capital of that economic entity.
According to Part 5 of Article 13 of the Law, in the case of the acquisition of a share, the participants in the concentration are the economic entity acquiring the share and the economic entity in whose charter (pooled) capital the share is being acquired.
PAGE 13
According to Part 8 of Article 13 of the Law, a concentration within the meaning of the Law is deemed to occur in:
the same product market (horizontal concentration),
different product markets with a certain interrelationship (vertical concentration), and
different product markets (mixed concentration).
According to Point 2 of Part 1 of Article 15 of the Law, the concentration of economic entities is subject to notification prior to being put into effect if the total amount of revenue of the participants in the concentration, or the amount of revenue of at least one of the participants, in the last financial year preceding the submission of the concentration notification, exceeds the amount of revenue established by the decision of the Commission.
According to the Commission’s Decision No. 553-N of August 15, 2025 “On defining the sizes of assets and revenues of participants of concentrations subject to declaration, the procedure for declaration of concentration, and the form of declaration, and declaring void the Decision No. 322-N of November 9, 2021 of the Commission for the Protection of Competition” (hereinafter also referred to as Decision No. 553-N), Appendix 1 sets out the thresholds for assets and revenues of participants in concentrations subject to declaration. Specifically, according to Point 1, Sub-point 1 of Appendix 1 of Decision No. 553-N, the concentration of economic entities is subject to declaration prior to being put into effect if the total value of the assets of the participants in the concentration at the time of submitting the concentration declaration or in the preceding financial year exceeded four billion drams, or the value of the assets of at least one of the participants at the time of submitting the concentration declaration or in the preceding financial year exceeded three billion drams.
According to Part 1 of Article 70 of the Law, the Commission prohibits a concentration subject to declaration if:
according to the results of the Commission’s studies, as a result of the concentration, economic competition in the relevant product market will be prevented, restricted, prohibited, or otherwise worsened, or
according to the results of the Commission’s studies, the concentration will lead to the emergence or strengthening of a dominant position, or
according to the results of the Commission’s studies, consumer interests will be harmed as a result of the concentration, or
the participant in the concentration does not submit information considered essential by the Commission to assess the impact of the concentration in the relevant product market, and
PAGE 14
it is impossible to obtain such information from other sources, or 5) the participant in the concentration has submitted false information considered essential by the Commission for assessing the impact of the concentration in the relevant product market, which negatively affected the course and results of the study conducted by the Commission.
According to Part 1 of Article 71 of the Law, a mixed concentration and a concentration of economic entities included in a group of persons is permitted under a simplified procedure if there is an apparent absence of grounds for prohibiting the concentration.
According to Part 1 of Article 72 of the Law, in the absence of grounds for prohibiting the concentration, the Commission permits the concentration subject to declaration.
From the facts of this case, it follows that “Kuprar RA” Company was founded on February 6, 2026, and is █[REDACTED]█. The █[REDACTED]█ percentage share in the charter capital of “Kuprar RA” Company belongs to “█[REDACTED]█” Company. “█[REDACTED]█” Company (█[REDACTED]█) was founded on August 14, 2025, and carries out █[REDACTED]█. The █[REDACTED]█ percentage share of the charter capital of “█[REDACTED]█” Company belongs to a physical person: █[REDACTED]█. The companies interconnected with the physical person █[REDACTED]█ operate in █[REDACTED]█.
The “Teghut” Company carries out the production and sale of copper ore and concentrates, and molybdenum concentrate, and the █[REDACTED]█ percentage share of the charter capital belongs to “█[REDACTED]█” Company (█[REDACTED]█). The copper ore and concentrates during 2025 were exported to █[REDACTED]█.
█[REDACTED]█.
PAGE 15
Taking into account the above, the transaction of acquiring a █[REDACTED]█ percentage share of the charter capital of the “Teghut” Company by the “Kuprar RA” Company constitutes, within the meaning of the Law, a mixed concentration, which will not lead to the prevention, restriction, prohibition, or other deterioration of economic competition, nor to the harm of consumer interests, under which conditions the grounds for prohibiting the concentration are absent.
Taking into account the above, the Commission concludes that the concentration through the acquisition of a █[REDACTED]█ percentage share of the charter capital of the “Teghut” Company by the “Kuprar RA” Company is subject to permission.
5. Final part.
Based on the above and governed by Part 2 of Article 67, Part 1 of Article 69, Part 2 of Article 72, Part 1 of Article 101 of the Law, Articles 70 and 71 of the Law “On the Fundamentals of Administration and Administrative Proceedings,” as well as Point 1 of Part 1 of Article 72 of the Administrative Procedure Code of the Republic of Armenia, the Commission
DECIDED:
To permit the concentration of “Kuprar RA” Closed Joint-Stock Company and “Teghut” Closed Joint-Stock Company through the acquisition by “Kuprar RA” Closed Joint-Stock Company of a █[REDACTED]█ percentage share of the charter capital of “Teghut” Closed Joint-Stock Company.
This decision enters into force for each addressee in its respective part from the day following the delivery of its copy to “Kuprar RA” Closed Joint-Stock Company and “Teghut” Closed Joint-Stock Company, respectively.
Point 1 of this decision is valid for a period of one year.
This decision may be appealed through administrative or judicial channels within a two-month period from the moment of its entry into force.
An appeal against this decision does not suspend its operation (execution).
TEMPORARY ACTING CHAIRMAN T. MARKOSYAN
7 July 2026 Yerevan
__________________________________________
Today we reviewed the competition authority’s decision. Next week, we will focus on the financial settlement — and when it actually happened. Almost no one noticed.
Gibraltar’s £1.8 billion Pelagos Data Centres — the largest infrastructure investment in the territory’s history — is backed by the government and funded by private capital. But its power source remains a matter of speculation, and the evidence suggests a project built on narrative rather than engineering reality.
Pelagos Data Centres, announced in September 2025, promises a 250 MW campus on a 20,000 sq m site near the Port of Gibraltar, with the first phase due to become operational in late 2027. The facility is designed to be entirely off-grid, powered by a combination of renewable energy and liquefied natural gas. The project is backed by the Gibraltar Government, with Chief Minister Fabian Picardo describing it as a “massive investment” that will benefit the whole community.
But the question that has hung over the project from the start is where the power will come from. The answer, according to the project’s chairman, Konstantin Sokolov and Christian Ryan, President for Gibraltar Operations, is Northern Pillar Energy — a consortium that claims to be developing a 4.2 GW solar-to-subsea-cable project connecting Morocco to Gibraltar, with fibre-optic capacity of up to 300 Tbps and a scheduled construction start in 2026.
The problem is that the deeper one looks, the less substance there is to the claim. Northern Pillar Energy is, in effect, a consortium without members — no public list of participants, no disclosed investors, and no verifiable contracts.
A BESS Developer, not a Сable Builder
The energy project’s only named partner is KX Power, a UK-registered asset manager of utility-scale battery energy storage systems. According to UK corporate filings, KX Power Limited is a micro-entity with 10 employees, total assets of £14.9 million and cash in bank of £9.56 million. Its CEO is Dr. Zhe Zhang, a long-standing business partner of Konstantin Sokolov, mentioned in our blog many times. KX Power does not disclose its investors; its ultimate parent is registered in the British Virgin Islands.
KX Power’s actual business is developing and managing utility-scale battery energy storage (BESS) systems. The company builds grid-scale batteries that provide frequency response, flexibility, and stabilisation services to the UK’s National Grid . Its portfolio includes an 80 MW/160 MWh project at Immingham, a 250 MW/500 MWh project in Scotland , and a joint venture with BlackRock backed by up to £200 million . A recent project was subject to a national security review by the UK government under the National Security and Investment Act, underscoring the sensitivity of its ownership structure.
None of this relates to subsea HVDC cables. BESS is a short-duration, localised technology — batteries discharge for minutes to hours, providing flexibility within a single grid. A 4.2 GW intercontinental cable, by contrast, is a long-distance, high-capacity transmission asset requiring multi-billion-dollar supply chain commitments: cable manufacturing contracts, specialist cable-laying vessels, converter stations, and intergovernmental agreements. KX Power has demonstrated no expertise in HVDC transmission and has disclosed no contracts for such a project.
The company’s core business — battery storage optimisation and grid services — is completely orthogonal to building a subsea power link across the Strait of Gibraltar. Its presence as Northern Pillar’s only named partner signals a limited technical and financial foundation for the project.
Morocco’s Capacity: a Numbers Problem
Morocco’s total renewable energy capacity at the end of 2025 was 4,851 MW, according to IRENA’s Renewable Capacity Statistics 2026. That is the entire installed renewable fleet of the kingdom: solar (1,086 MW), onshore wind (2,452 MW), hydropower (1,306 MW) and bioenergy (7 MW). Northern Pillar alone claims 4.2 GW — roughly 87% of Morocco’s entire current renewable capacity. By comparison, the NOOR Atlas programme currently under construction is adding only 225 MWp across four solar plants under MASEN.
Morocco has achieved a renewable share of 39.6% of installed capacity, the highest in North Africa, but its priority remains domestic consumption, not large-scale export. The kingdom’s peak demand continues to grow, and its 814 MW of pumped hydro storage is designed to balance its own grid.
The Morocco–Europe Connection: a Crowded Field
Morocco already operates the only electricity interconnection between Africa and Europe — two 700 MW subsea cables across the Strait of Gibraltar, commissioned in 1997 and 2006, with bidirectional capacity of 1,400 MW . A third Morocco–Spain line, adding 700 MW, is planned for 2026 .
Beyond Spain, several larger projects are at various stages of development:
Morocco–Portugal: In July 2026, the energy ministers of both countries formally agreed to build a 1 GW interconnection, estimated at €735–800 million. They will apply to the European Commission for funding and seek designation as a Project of Common European Interest (IPCEI).
Morocco–France: Mentioned in ONEE planning documents as a future connection, but no detailed project has been publicly presented. Xlinks is also reportedly exploring a French variant of its concept.
Morocco–Germany (Sila Atlantik): This is the most ambitious — and the most stalled. It is also, critically, the same developer as Xlinks. After the UK government withdrew support for the Morocco–UK cable in June 2025, Xlinks pivoted to Germany, launching a new vehicle called Sila Atlantik to keep the project alive.
The Xlinks Precedent
The comparison of Northern Pillar with Xlinks is unavoidable. Xlinks was a serious project: a 3.6 GW proposal to bring renewable energy from Morocco to the UK via 3,800 km of subsea cables, landing at Alverdiscott in Devon. It had secured 3.6 GW connection agreements with National Grid, had been designated a “project of National Significance” by the UK government, and had raised more than £100 million in development funding from investors including TotalEnergies, TAQA, Octopus Energy, and GE Vernova.
Yet in June 2025, the UK government formally withdrew support. Energy Minister Michael Shanks stated that the scheme was “not in the UK national interest at this time” and “does not clearly align strategically with the government’s mission to build homegrown power here in the UK”. The government refused to grant a 25-year Contract for Difference (CfD) — a price guarantee that would have made the project financeable.
Sir Dave Lewis, chair of Xlinks, said the company was “hugely surprised and bitterly disappointed”. But the decision was final. Xlinks is now exploring private off-takers — AI companies, cloud providers, data centres — as a fallback.
The parallel with Northern Pillar is exact: without a government-backed price guarantee, a $30+ billion subsea cable project cannot attract the financing required to book cable manufacturing slots or secure specialist cable-laying vessels, which are already allocated years in advance.
Northern Pillar’s Missing Architecture
Northern Pillar lacks the elements that Xlinks spent years assembling:
No public agreement with MASEN. Morocco’s energy strategy is managed by the Moroccan Agency for Sustainable Energy. Xlinks had documented engagement; Northern Pillar’s website cites MASEN only as a source for Morocco’s renewable statistics, not as a project partner.
No land allocation in Morocco. A 4.2 GW solar complex would require thousands of hectares. The NOOR Ouarzazate complex, at 582 MW, is the world’s largest concentrated solar power plant and took years to develop. No such site has been identified for Northern Pillar.
No cable manufacturing or ship contracts. HVDC cable production and cable-laying vessels are booked years in advance. Xlinks had secured manufacturing slots; Northern Pillar has disclosed no such commitments.
No confirmed buyer. Gibraltar’s peak demand is approximately 80 MW. Taking 10% of a 4.2 GW cable would mean importing around 400 MW — five times the territory’s current peak consumption. The remaining 3.8 GW would need to be sold into European markets. There is no public evidence of agreements with Spain, the EU, or any corporate off-taker.
A Timeline Fantasy
Northern Pillar’s website states construction will begin in 2026. That would require contracts signed now, years before the industry’s manufacturing and installation capacity is available. Xlinks, with far more development work completed, was aiming for operations in the early 2030s.
The reality of subsea HVDC infrastructure is that the supply chain is structurally constrained. Prysmian, Nexans and their peers have order books extending to the early 2030s. A project without advanced commitments to manufacturing slots and cable-laying vessels cannot begin construction in 2026 — regardless of how much capital it claims to be able to raise.
Conclusion: a Narrative, Not a Project
In previous articles we have examined Pelagos Data Centres from every angle — the constrained North Mole site, the marine-supported renders next to Waterport Terraces, the absence of a clear 20,000 sq m land plot, the proximity to the airport glide path and the residential blocks, the planning vacuum and the political scaffolding that currently holds the announcement together. Even if every one of those difficulties were somehow overcome, a more fundamental problem remains: where the power for Phases 2–5 is supposed to come from.
The official story points to Northern Pillar Energy — a 4.2 GW solar-to-subsea-cable concept linking Morocco to Gibraltar. On the publicly available evidence that concept does not function. There is no disclosed consortium, no land allocation in Morocco, no agreement with MASEN, no cable manufacturing or vessel contracts, no confirmed offtakers for the surplus capacity, and a construction start date of 2026 that is incompatible with the realities of the HVDC supply chain. The only named industrial partner is a UK battery-storage developer whose actual business has nothing to do with intercontinental transmission. The precedent of Xlinks — a far more advanced project that still collapsed when government support was withdrawn — only sharpens the point.
Pelagos may yet be built in some reduced form. But on current information it will not be powered by a cable from Morocco. Northern Pillar Energy is not a project. It is a narrative.
August 10, 2026 (Translated from Armenian to English. Original article by Vahe Sarukhanyan, published on HETQ.AM, August 03, 2026)
Post №100 — and the icing on the cake is that this one is a translation from Hetq.am. Couldn’t have scheduled it better.
U.S. authorities have doubled the volume of the TRIPP+ Enterprise Fund, increasing it from $201 million to $402 million. This is reported by the American website highergov.com, which tracks, among other things, government-allocated grants.
The TRIPP+ Enterprise Fund was established earlier this year on January 26, two weeks after the Washington meeting (January 13, 2026) between Armenian Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan and U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio. At the conclusion of that meeting, the diplomats released a document revealing that the parties would establish a company to develop and implement the infrastructure of the TRIPP route passing through southern Armenia — the TRIPP Development Company.
Armenia will hold 26% of its shares, while the U.S. — specifically TRIPP Development Company US, to be incorporated in Delaware — will hold 74%. That entity will be a subsidiary of the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC), a U.S. government agency.
As we have previously written, the TRIPP Development Company and the TRIPP+ Fund are separate entities.
On the same day, January 26, the TRIPP+ Enterprise Fund was also established in Delaware. Its head was appointed as Konstantin Sokolov, a businessman who supports the current U.S. Republican administration and President Trump in particular. Sokolov, as we have noted, is officially a 20% shareholder of Armenia’s largest mobile operator, Viva Armenia CJSC.
In July, citing The Guardian, we reported on the fund’s expected operations. The British outlet, citing a U.S. State Department spokesperson, wrote that the fund is authorized to make $201 million in investments in the South Caucasus and Central Asia — namely Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. The purpose of the investments is to promote strategic private-sector development in these countries, with investments taking the form of loans, equity investments, and grants.
We also noted that the enterprise fund is a financial mechanism used by the U.S. government, with roots dating back to 1989. Through such funds, the U.S. has for years made investments in Eastern European countries, particularly those that were once part of the socialist bloc.
Each enterprise fund operates as an independent, autonomous organization managed by a board of directors, with the U.S. government responsible for overseeing its operations.
Thus, according to highergov.com, the U.S. State Department’s Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs awarded a $201 million grant to the TRIPP+ Fund on January 30. The funds are to be disbursed over nearly 11 years, through December 31, 2036.
According to the same source, on July 16 a modification was made, and the U.S. government committed to allocating $402 million in grants to the TRIPP+ Enterprise Fund. The disbursement timeline remains the same — through the end of 2036. From the highergov.com data, we can conclude that the entire amount has already been allocated to the TRIPP+ Fund (see chart).
According to the same source, the primary destination for these funds will be Armenia.
On August 4, K. Sokolov Archive in article “Officials: Sokolov’s TRIPP+ obligations doubled to $402M” questioned reports that TRIPP+ funding had doubled from $201M to $402M, suggesting it was likely a technical swap rather than a real increase.
In terms of the money, right now $201 million has been committed, that money is going to be invested in order to enhance TRIPP and things associated with it.
The confusion originated from USAspending.gov, where a notation showed the existing $201M allocation being replaced with funds from another source — creating the appearance of a doubled figure.
Lightstone added:
I look at the $201 [million] as a floor, not a ceiling.
Our original analysis from August 4:
“We cannot be certain that the AEECA funds have been fully de-obligated. It is possible that the $402 million currently shown in the system represents the total sum of all transactions processed so far, and that the de-obligation of the original AEECA funds has not yet been reflected in the public database.”
The K. Sokolov Archive’s reading of public data proved accurate. We called it first. We deserve a cookie.
According to the pitch book for the Gotthard Investment Fund 2015 a Liechtenstein-based fund for professional investors (a critical update: the fund was subsequently liquidated in July 2020, with Ernst & Young approving its final closing balance sheet), managed by VP Fund Solutions AG – Konstantin Sokolov served as Vice Chairman and managing partner at Gotthard Investment AG in Switzerland, alongside his Swiss partner Roland Raeber. Together, they acted as Fund Managers of Gotthard InvestmentFund / Gotthard Umbrella Fund signing off on all the fund’s transactions.
Today, for an American citizen and a close associate of Donald Trump, direct affiliation with a European fund is no longer comme il faut. New projects require new partners and new instruments.
In early 2024, we republished HETQ.AM’s investigation into the new owners of MTS Armenia. That investigation first revealed Sokolov’s new partner: the Chinese entrepreneur Zhe Zhang, and his connection to the management of Halcon Investment SICAV through SIFT Capital Partners Limited. That fund, in turn, controls AMIO Bank via the Cypriot company Elguma Investment Ltd. and Swiss MFM Global AG.
ChatGPT generated group picture of Konstantin Sokolov, Dr. Zhe Zhang, and Michael Stockford.
The Switch: SIFT out, Blue Water in
In the publicly available reports for 2024 and 2025, SIFT Capital Partners Limited is no longer listed as the portfolio manager for Halcon Investment Fund. In its place: Blue Water Capital Management Limited.
Did Zhe Zhang simply disappear? We think not. Blue Water Capital Management Limited, with its CEO Michael Stockford, is closely tied to Zhang – and, through him, to Sokolov.
What did Blue Water do for Halcon Innovation Fund investors in 2025?
The 2025 Halcon report includes a notification that the delegated portfolio manager changed its name from Redbridge Capital Management Limited to Blue Water Capital Management Limited.
The fee structure is revealing. According to Halcon’s 2025 accounts, Blue Water’s total remuneration was HKD 7.237 million (≈ USD 928,000). Within that, the “Asset Management & Investment Advisory” fee specifically for the Halcon Innovation Fund was €305,729 – a reasonable and transparent charge.
Blue Water also signed two major loan agreements in 2025 on behalf of Halcon: €13.7 million to MFM Global Invest AG (seemingly for the acquisition of a Swiss hotel) and €24.9 million to Remido Holdings Ltd – both entities connected to the wider Sokolov–Zhang ecosystem, as we previously covered.
Effective 16 April 2026, the fund introduced two new unit classes as follows: HIF-EUR1M — for large institutional investors (minimum €1 million) — and HIF-DIRECT, a direct class for retail or qualified investors.
Alongside these, the fund also adapted its Liquidity Management Tools to comply with new European regulations, which include a redemption-in-kind option.These changes may look like standard regulatory housekeeping. But they quietly give the manager new tools that can shift the rules of the game. New investors could find themselves locked into less favorable redemption terms, or — in the case of redemption-in-kind — receive assets instead of cash when they try to exit. In a fund already opaque and heavily invested in illiquid projects, this adds another layer of unpredictability for newcomers.
What Blue Water Capital Management actually does
According to its website, Blue Water works exclusively with Professional Investors as defined under Hong Kong’s Securities and Futures Ordinance (individuals with at least HKD 8 million – roughly USD 1 million – in securities). It holds SFC licences Type 4 (advising on securities) and Type 9 (asset management), registration BAU760, and operates under Hong Kong law.
Blue Water does not manage the fund directly. It acts as a delegated portfolio manager. Its direct client is not the end-investor in Liechtenstein, but the fund’s management company – ONE Funds AG (registered in Liechtenstein). ONE Funds AG, as a licensed AIFM, hires Blue Water to manage the Halcon Innovation Fund portfolio. Crucially, Blue Water signs all decisions and contracts on behalf of the fund – a standard practice for such delegated structures.
The Hatcher Group deal: Stockford and Zhang help Tanner consolidate control
In early 2025, a deal on Hong Kong’s GEM exchange would have gone unnoticed – if not for its architecture. Hatcher Group Limited – a boutique consultancy specialising in taking Chinese mainland companies public – changed its controlling shareholder. Formally, through a standard rights issue. Informally, through a three-party operation where each participant played a distinct role.
Hatcher Group is not a financial giant. It is a boutique firm with 100–150 employees, formerly known as VBG International Holdings. Its business: guiding mainland companies through the Hong Kong listing process – IPO advisory, M&A, corporate finance, ESG reporting. Listing was a pragmatic step, giving it access to public capital and strengthening client trust.
That same public status made Hatcher Group a target.
The buyer was Tanner Enterprises, controlled by Hong Kong businessman Li Man Keung Edwin. His goal: to increase his stake from 10.62% to a controlling position. The instrument: a rights issue with underwriting.
Tanner agreed to buy any shares not taken up by existing shareholders. The risk was obvious: if the market didn’t support the deal, Tanner would get the company – but at a full price. If someone else tried to intercept the package, Tanner would get nothing.
To rule out the second scenario, Michael Stockford was brought in – founder of Redbridge Capital Management Limited (later renamed Blue Water Capital). Stockford became an executive director of Hatcher Group on 1 October 2024. His companies served two roles: fund manager for the subscriber and placing agent for unsubscribed shares – at zero commission.
The crucial element, however, was SIFT Capital Partners Limited – the Hong Kong asset manager founded by Zhe Zhang. SIFT subscribed to convertible bonds in Hatcher Group worth HKD 5.67 million, convertible into 18 million shares (up to 42% of the company). Formally, this was an independent transaction. In practice, it was a safety net.
As long as SIFT held the bonds, any outsider eyeing control knew that Zhang could convert at any moment and dilute their stake. This wasn’t a blocker – it was a deterrent. And it worked in Tanner’s favour.
When the rights issue closed, Tanner Enterprises had taken 65 million unsubscribed shares, raising its stake to 48.63%. Consolidation was complete. SIFT never converted – the bonds were never needed. Stockford stayed on the board, and his Redbridge soon rebranded to Blue Water Capital Management.
Official documents from the Hong Kong Stock Exchange (HKEX) – the Hatcher Group Circular dated 10 January 2025 – neatly separate the participants: Zhang as the subscriber’s ultimate beneficial owner, Stockford as the owner of the management company, Tanner as the underwriter. There are no formal ties between them. But the logic of the deal suggests otherwise: three parties, synchronised in one process, with one goal – transferring control of a public company.
Source: Hatcher Group Limited Circular, 10 January 2025 (HKEX). Page 43. The same document names Redbridge Capital Management (Michael Stockford) as the investment manager and Dr. Zhe Zhang (SIFT Capital Partners) as the ultimate beneficial owner of the CB Subscriber.”
This is not collusion in the legal sense. It is a coordinated operation, where everyone knew their role. And the coincidences – the rebranding of Redbridge at the same time as the deal closed – are at the very least significant.
After reading this brief account, one thing becomes clear: Blue Water Capital is far from a stranger to the shareholders of VIVA Armenia and AMIO Bank. It couldn’t be otherwise. The chain is consistent: Sokolov’s old Swiss structure, Zhang’s SIFT Capital, Stockford’s Blue Water – they all converge around the same assets. The rebranding, the appointments, the loans, the consolidation – all point to a stable, if informal, network operating across jurisdictions, from Liechtenstein to Hong Kong, via Cyprus and Armenia.
Disclaimer & Forward-Looking Analysis:This article is for informational and educational purposes only and does not constitute legal, financial, or regulatory advice. All findings, linkages, and conclusions presented herein represent the authors’ analytical opinions, derived solely from the chronological correlation of verified dates, cross-border corporate filings, and publicly available disclosures from the Hong Kong Stock Exchange (HKEX) and the Liechtenstein Financial Market Authority (FMA). Unless explicitly cited from official regulatory documents, any inferences regarding parallel intent, nominee status, or informal networks are speculative hypotheses intended to stimulate public interest and independent analysis. This material does not accuse any mentioned individual or corporate entity of legal non-compliance, regulatory violations, or market collusion.
August 05, 2026 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Armenia release)
On 5 August, Foreign Minister of Armenia Ararat Mirzoyan received Aryeh Lightstone, Senior Advisor to the U.S. Special Envoy for Peace Missions. Konstantin Sokolov, President of the Trans-Caspian Enterprise Fund, also attended the meeting.
Both sides emphasized the significant developments and achievements recorded since the Washington Peace Summit of 8 August, 2025. Underscoring the importance of the established peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan for unlocking the region’s full development potential, the interlocutors also discussed possible steps aimed at further strengthening of peace.
The interlocutors welcomed the active dynamics of recent high-level visits and agreements, the tangible achievements in developing Armenia-U.S. Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, which are also the result of the implementation of the three memoranda signed in Washington just one year ago, on 8 August. Among a number of initiatives, the actively developing cooperation in the field of artificial intelligence and the launch of the data center (AI Factory) being constructed under the first phase of the Firebird AI company’s megaproject were emphasized.
Ararat Mirzoyan and Aryeh Lightstone also discussed opportunities and programs for trade and economic cooperation, as well as interaction aimed at strengthening Armenia’s economic and energy resilience.
At the meeting, issues aimed at promoting regional connectivity and realizing the existing competitive advantages along that path were discussed in detail. The activities towards the implementation of the TRIPP program were touched upon; both sides emphasized the interest in the implementation of the program on the ground within the shortest possible timeframes. Views were exchanged on the prospects for Armenia’s most effective integration into the international transport and infrastructure system.
The interlocutors also touched upon other issues of mutual interest.
Tripp+ Enterprise Fund was awarded Project Grant SEUACE26GR0002 worth $402,000,000 from the Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs in January 2026 with work to be completed primarily in Armenia. The grant has a duration of 11 years and was awarded through assistance program 19.878 EUR-Other. According to the US government spending database HigherGov (14 days free subscription).
According to the transaction history description as of January 30, 2026: “THE AWARD IS BEING MODIFIED TO SWAP OUT FUNDS. SPECIFICALLY, F HAS INSTRUCTED EUR/ACE TO SWAP THE CURRENT $201 MILLION AEECA FUNDS WITH NSIP FUNDS. THE GO WILL THEREFORE MAKE TWO AMENDMENTS TO THE GRANT. THE FIRST ONE WILL OBLIGATE $201 MILLION NSIP FUNDS. THE SECOND AMENDMENT WILL DE-OBLIGATED $201 MILLION AEECA FUNDS”.
In our view, this substitution appears to be a technical but potentially significant manoeuvre. The original $201 million from the AEECA (Assistance for Europe, Eurasia and Central Asia) programme is being replaced by funds from the new State Department programme — the National Security Investment Programs (NSIP). However, based on the available data, we cannot be certain that the AEECA funds have been fully de-obligated. It is possible that the $402 million currently shown in the system represents the total sum of all transactions processed so far, and that the de-obligation of the original AEECA funds has not yet been reflected in the public database. Until that happens, the true nature of this operation — whether a genuine swap or a real increase — remains technically unclear.
According to the Congressional Research Service (CRS) report R48956, NSIP was established in FY2026 specifically to consolidate the authorities of the Development Assistance, Economic Support Fund, and AEECA accounts into a single, more flexible funding stream. Unlike AEECA, NSIP provides the fund’s management with significantly greater discretion, allowing funds to be directed toward a broader range of objectives — from infrastructure to commercial and political goals. Its FY2026 budget stands at $6.77 billion.
We do not have conclusive evidence that the TRIPP+ money will be directly used for the Teghut purchase. If the administration intends to finance the Teghut acquisition — reportedly controlled by entities linked to Sokolov — through the NSIP mechanism, it would be a logical, albeit opaque, way to do so. We are not asserting this as fact.
August 2, 2026 (transcript of a parliamentary speech originally delivered in Armenian; video published by Yerevan Today on YouTube)
During the first session of Armenia’s 9th convocation of the National Assembly, opposition MP Mesrop Manukyan delivered a sharp critique of ruling-party candidate for Speaker, Ruben Rubinyan. Manukyan drew comparisons between the financial trajectories of former Speakers Ararat Mirzoyan and Alen Simonyan and the current candidate, alleging conflicts of interest tied to Rubinyan’s brother’s positions in banking and telecommunications, as well as the growing influence of businessman Konstantin Sokolov in Armenia’s strategic sectors. Manukyan concluded that Rubinyan overshadows his predecessors, calling him the “octopus” of the Civil Contract party.
Full Translation from Armenian to English:
“Dear citizens, those who have held the position of Speaker of Parliament from the Civil Contract party have undergone certain transformations. I would like to delve a little deeper into this and understand, Mr. Rubinyan, from what point you started and where you will end up.
Ararat Mirzoyan once spoke of his financial difficulties, of being denied credit to purchase a television. Today, he walks about in a Brunello Cucinelli vest worth several million drams. In Yerevan, near the Red Cross, he is acquiring a mansion — this is from his declaration.
Now, I see no issue with a high-ranking official of the Republic of Armenia — and that includes you, Mr. Rubinyan — presenting themselves with dignity, as they represent the state. However, the question arises: how do these transformations take place? Similar questions have also emerged regarding former Speaker of the National Assembly Alen Simonyan. His property transactions have become a matter of public discussion.
Here is an interesting point: is there not a conflict of interest in the Central Bank being an equity shareholder in a commercial bank? In other words, how can the Central Bank go and audit this company? But I will set that aside and continue, as I have much more to say.
In 2023, Mr. Rubinyan, MTS Armenia submitted an application to purchase from some offshore-registered auto dealer — I apologize for the phrasing, as this individual, if I am not mistaken, is a certain 50-year-old Manolis Tarkhanadis from Cyprus, who was engaged in car trading but wished to acquire a mobile operator in Armenia. They were refused on national security grounds.
Next, we see that the Hrazdan Cement plant is owned by Amio Bank. Citizens, this is a commercial organization with state participation — the state should have managed it directly. It is heading toward bankruptcy, and there is state involvement here because it belongs to Amio Bank, where Levon Rubinyan is present.
The next notable transaction: Rostelecom is acquired, Viva Armenia is acquired. Two major operators are being purchased, and on the management board of the very same Viva Armenia sits Levon Rubinyan.
Is this normal?
Furthermore, the same Sokolov was appointed chairman of the TRIPP fund. There is also information that he acquired a stake in our mining giants.
We have identified four critical sectors: finance, infrastructure, mining, and telecommunications. For any state, these are sectors of strategic and defense significance — and in Armenia’s case, they are of particular importance to Turkey. And here the question arises: the TRIPP project manager Sokolov, with Turkey being the largest beneficiary of these projects, on one hand — and on the other hand, the brother of Armenia’s chief negotiator with Turkey is deeply involved in these processes.
Is this strange or not?
Mr. Rubinyan, I will speak honestly: I have tried to understand where Alen Simonyan and Ararat Mirzoyan started and where they have ended up. At this point, I cannot even identify your starting point. And it creates the impression that Alen Simonyan and Ararat Mirzoyan are small fish compared to you. You are the octopus of the Civil Contract — that is the impression I get, a sea monster. And this is not personal — it is a political assessment.”
But when you look beyond the glossy renders and economic promises, you find a more troublesome reality: the project is being built wall-to-wall with a residential neighborhood. Six blocks of Waterport Terraces, home to 492 flats, sit directly next to this industrial giant. While the world is waking up to the noise crisis caused by data centers, with communities in the United States filing massive class-action lawsuits, Gibraltar is building its own potential acoustic nightmare in the heart of a residential area. For the residents of Waterport Terraces, this isn’t just a new neighbor; it is a threat to their health, their peace, and the value of their homes.
A “Data Storage” Facility or a Heavy Industrial Plant?
Developers have a tried-and-tested trick: call a data center a “data storage” or “office facility.” It sounds clean and quiet. In reality, a modern high-density facility is a heavy industrial operation that runs 24/7/365. The powerful AI chips inside generate immense heat, requiring industrial-scale cooling towers and HVAC systems to prevent them from melting. These systems produce a constant, low-frequency hum—a drone that is almost impossible to block with standard windows or walls.
Now, amplify that problem with the geography of Waterport Terraces. The estate is not a collection of spread-out houses. It is six tall concrete blocks that form a closed courtyard. Instead of dissipating over the water, the low-frequency noise from Pelagos’s cooling systems will hit these massive facades and bounce back, creating a resonance chamber. This “acoustic trap” means residents will not just hear the noise—they will feel it.
It’s a phenomenon already documented in the area. A 2015 environmental statement for the neighboring North Mole Power Station noted that operational noise from that facility posed a “high” risk of disturbance to “residential and non-residential receptors,” specifically mentioning Waterport Terrace. The 15MW diesel station that ran close to Waterport Terrace from 1982 to 2020 was a living nightmare for residents. Its infamous noise pollution was a daily assault on their peace. The new data center, with its massive cooling infrastructure, threatens to be far worse.
The U.S. Blueprint: A Crisis of Lawsuits and Lost Value
The United States, the global capital of data infrastructure, is currently facing a massive civil revolt against this exact problem. This isn’t a local skirmish—it’s a systemic crisis.
In Mississippi, the battle against data center pollution has taken two forms. The NAACP has filed a lawsuit over unpermitted air emissions from the gas turbines powering xAI’s Colossus facility. But for the residents of Southaven, the immediate crisis is something else entirely: a class-action lawsuit over “omnipresent and inescapable” noise—a constant drone they compare to a “jet engine” that has eroded their health and home values. In April 2026, NBC News traveled to Mississippi to report on the $20 billion xAI project, where local residents voiced the same fears: noise, environmental damage, and the slow destruction of their quality of life.
This is not an isolated event. In Dowagiac, Michigan, a similar class-action lawsuit was filed against Hyperscale Data, Inc., with attorneys estimating around 100 affected residents attended their first informational forum. The lawsuit alleges the facility’s noise has been a “physical invasion” of neighboring properties. Residents described the sound using words like “whining,” “annoying,” and “invasive,” with many saying it has led to migraines and fundamentally altered their enjoyment of their homes.
This pattern of litigation shows a clear link between industrial-scale data centers, constant low-frequency noise, and a collapse in the quality of life and property values for those living nearby. Homes within a mile of these sites can lose 15-20% of their market value. For the residents of Waterport Terraces, whose flats are not premium real estate but more affordable housing, the emergence of a 250MW industrial complex outside their windows threatens to turn their neighborhood from a waterside community into an industrial support zone.
When the Ocean’s Hum Is Replaced by Industry’s Drone: Who Defends the Residents?
This brings us to the crucial question: who is enabling this project? As we previously detailed, the Pelagos project is not just an engineering challenge; it’s a legal and political construction. The project’s Chairman, Konstantin Sokolov, has assembled a team with deep experience in clearing regulatory hurdles quietly. While the marketing pitch boasts an “eco-friendly, off-grid” facility, the reality of being off-grid means building a gas-turbine power plant just meters from family living rooms—a detail conveniently omitted from the press releases. When the inevitable noise complaints come—and they will—that same legal machinery will be deployed to defend the project against the claims of the 492 flats.
And it’s here that the story comes full circle. The primary argument of the U.S. lawsuits is a simple, common-law right: the right to the quiet enjoyment of one’s home. The sound of the sea, the breeze through the window—these are not luxuries; they are the substance of domestic life. The data center offers a different soundtrack: the relentless, low-frequency drone of industrial cooling, a hum that does not rise and fall with the tides but continues 24/7/365.
The residents of Waterport Terraces have a right to their peace and quiet. The data center has a right to operate. But right now, the balance is tilted entirely in favor of the project and its legal backers. If the Gibraltar data center is allowed to operate without adequate mitigation, it will establish a dangerous precedent: that industry can be placed wall-to-wall with housing, and that the sound of the sea matters less than the sound of servers.
This is a story we will continue to follow closely.
Thakre, C., & Vijay, R. (2024). Impact of low-frequency noise on a residential zone due to commercial HVAC systems. Journal of Building Engineering, 91 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jobe.2024.109616
Holeček, N. (2025). A CASE STUDY OF LOW-FREQUENCY NOISE. Facta Universitatis, Series: Working and Living Environmental Protection. https://doi.org/10.22190/FUWLEP2501001H
