Category: Konstantin Sokolov Investigations

  • Halcon’s 2025 Portfolio Review: €124M in Loans, a Zurich Hotel, and a Tiny Cash Balance

    July 16, 2026

    In our previous article, we broke down the 11.94% NAV decline and its connection to the AMIO Bank revaluation. Now let’s look at what the portfolio actually is — and how its structure has changed.

    By the end of 2025, the Halcon Innovation Fund had effectively distributed all its free cash. The bank balance stood at a symbolic €64,248 — barely enough to cover a few compliance invoices and maybe a team dinner at a mid-range Zurich restaurant. In its place sits €124.3 million in loans, making up 90% of the fund’s investments. Equity stakes account for just €14 million.

    A note for students of Sokolov Executive MBA Program at Chicago Booth: when you control the debts, you control the bank accounts, and you control the administrative management — you control the entire company. It doesn’t really matter who the ultimate beneficial owner is.

    All Cypriot companies interacting with the fund share common nominal directors and secretaries. The registers consistently list Fotoula Savva — director, GIF Management Limited — secretary. GIF Management Ltd is a 100% subsidiary of GIF Capital Ltd. This points to a concentrated and unified management network (we first identified this network in our 2025 investigation).

    The 10% Assets on the Balance Sheet: Securities

    The fund’s equity portfolio may be small compared to the loan book, but it holds the keys to the most valuable and opaque assets in the structure. As of December 31, 2025, the securities holdings stood at €14,016,859 — just 10% of total investments, but strategically the most significant piece of the puzzle.

    Elguma Investment Ltd. (Cyprus) — €10,622,784. This is the crown jewel. Elguma Investment Limited, a Cyprus-based company, holds the fund’s indirect stake in AMIO Bank (Armenia). Since December 2022, the fund has held close to 75% of AMIO Bank through a multi-jurisdictional and multi-unit structure — with MFM Global AG as the key holding vehicle.

    Daloxan Trading Ltd. (Cyprus) — €3,384,042. Daloxan is a holding company that owns five other Cypriot firms, each dedicated to property acquisition and development. This is the engine room of the fund’s real estate activities — the entity that aggregates the land bank and funnels it into the various development projects across Limassol and beyond.

    Vadonas Services Ltd. (Cyprus) — €1. Yes, you read that correctly. One euro. Vadonas Services Ltd is linked with fund borrower Curium Palace Hotel Ltd (CY) and developing the Kourio project in Limassol — a commercial development that we’ll cover in a separate article.

    The Loan Book: Who Got What in 2025

    According to the investment inventory as of December 31, 2025, the fund’s total loan receivables stood at €124.3 million.

    Only two major new loans were issued in 2025: €13.7 million to MFM Global Invest AG — seemingly for the acquisition of the Swiss hotel — and €24.9 million to Remido Holdings Ltd.

    The rest are legacy loans to the familiar cast of GIF-linked Cypriot entities.

    The rest are legacy loans to the familiar cast of GIF-linked Cypriot entities.

    BorrowerAmount (EUR)
    Remido Holdings Ltd (CY)€77,524,718
    MFM Global Invest AG (CH)€13,700,000
    Raterino Trading Ltd (CY)€12,959,026
    Lisemin Group Ltd (CY)€9,660,579
    Quensingas Ltd (CY)€7,354,371
    Curium Palace Hotel Ltd (CY)€1,487,500
    Vadonas Services Ltd (CY)€910,525
    Elguma Investment Ltd (CY)€410,000
    Sikedrono Holding Ltd (CY)€300,000

    Remido Holdings Ltd (HE 431702) is the fund’s single largest credit exposure, with total credit lines exceeding €77 million. This is the entity that has actively engaged with the Limassol Municipal Council. During town planning and zoning reviews in 2025 regarding Remido’s applications for major commercial developments, the Mayor of Limassol, Yiannis Armeftis, repeatedly recused himself from the floor. Deputy Mayor Demos Katsis oversaw the committee’s subsequent approvals. This recurring pattern of high-level administrative distance underscores the massive corporate stakes hanging over the municipality’s commercial zoning concessions to Sokolov’s financial web. (Source: Limassol Municipal Council minutes, 31.07.2025)

    MFM Global Invest AG (CH)— the same entity that holds 75% of AMIO Bank — received a €13.7 million loan from Halcon in 2025. The purpose? Acquiring the Kameha Grand Zurich, a five-star business hotel of the Autograph Collection (Marriott), located five minutes from Zurich Airport, 245 rooms.

    Kameha Grand Zurich

    The hotel was built in 2015 by developer Peter Mettler and hotelier Carsten Rath at a construction cost of CHF 121 million. Mettler had been trying to offload it for CHF 76–80 million for years. Inside Paradeplatz covered the sale attempts extensively. A neighbouring 5,000 sqm plot with development potential was reportedly part of the deal.

    In January 2026, we wrote about the management change at MFM Global Invest AG and linked the companies where Georg Murmann was appointed to the acquisition of control over the Kameha Grand Zurich. The 2025 annual report confirms this connection.

    According to the fund’s disclosures, these allocations support real estate development operations scaled up to 160,000 square metres.  In 2022, the fund acquired Cypriot concrete manufacturer Kokomix. In early 2025, it increased its stake from 95% to 100%, simplifying the holding structure.  Why does a tech and innovation fund own a cement plant? Vertical integration.  Vassiliko plant effectively controls the Cyprus raw cement market. The ready-mix concrete market is highly competitive, and Kokomix is among the top five producers. This gives the fund control over a critical link in the construction supply chain. There is also a practice of exporting dry cement and clinker to Gibraltar by sea. This logistical link matters because it connects to another project linked to Konstantin Sokolov: Pelagos Data Centres in Gibraltar. Ownership of Kokomix could theoretically provide leverage over cement markets beyond Cyprus — including potential infrastructure projects in Gibraltar, a jurisdiction linked to another network project, Pelagos Data Centres.

    We were unable to link the following borrowers to any identifiable projects – may concrete manufacturer, may be land plots in Cyprus: Raterino Trading Ltd.,  Lisemin Group Ltd, Quensingas Ltd, Sikedrono Holding Ltd. If you know something, the comments are open.

    The Administrative Shift: Bolder, Athos, and Cornelis Jan Quirijns

    In late 2025, MFM Global Invest AG changed its legal address to c/o Bolder Trustees (Switzerland) AG, Lindenstrasse 16, Baar. This is not a random change. As we detailed in July 2024, Bolder Group completed the acquisition of Athos Group — a company with a long history in Switzerland and Cyprus. Athos was formerly known as Henley Trust (Switzerland) AG. The key figure: Cornelis Jan Quirijns – he was a member of the board of directors of MFM Global Invest AG from November 2021 to July 2022, former CEO of Athos Group. After the Bolder acquisition, he took on the role of Global Head of Private Clients and Family Office. The address change to Bolder Trustees is not a technicality. It confirms that the administrative management of the holding company that owns AMIO Bank remains within the same professional trust provider network — connected with Cornelis Jan Quirijns professional and delicate administrative services.

    New Fund instruments: Unit Classes and the Redemption-in-Kind Trap

    Effective 16 April 2026, the fund introduced two new unit classes that follows – HIF-EUR1M — for large institutional investors (minimum €1 million); HIF-DIRECT — a direct class for retail or qualified investors.

    At the same time, the fund updated its Liquidity Management Tools and added a clause on Redemption in Kind. What this means for investors: if the fund doesn’t have cash to buy back units when an investor exits, it can settle with real estate, loans, or shares in unlisted companies. This is a standard risk for funds with illiquid assets. But in Halcon’s context, it means investors could end up holding stakes in Cypriot companies instead of euros.

    Who Signs Off?

    As of 2025, all investment decisions of the Halcon Innovation Fund — from defining the portfolio composition and selecting assets for purchase, holding or sale, to liquidity monitoring, stress testing and exit risk management, as well as organising capital expenditures, distributions and refinancing at the portfolio company level — formally fall under the purview of the Hong Kong-based portfolio manager, Blue Water Capital Management Limited. In our future article, we’ll examine the role of Blue Water Capital Management Limited — the Hong Kong-based portfolio manager — and its connection to Dr. Zhe Zhang, and the mechanisms through which the participants plan to profit from this structure.

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  • From Trump’s Ballroom to Armenian Infrastructure Projects: Sokolov Gets U.S. State Funds on Armenian Tricks

    July 15, 2026

    In May 2026, we analyzed in the article “The Rise, Collapse and Bizarre Afterlife of Armenia’s Teghut Copper Mine “ the strange journey of the Teghut copper-molybdenum deposit. We suggested that this strategic asset, which we estimated could be worth up to $22 billion, was being quietly prepared for resale to structures linked to Donald Trump.  The logic was simple: VTB, hit by sanctions, needed to offload a toxic asset, and Sergey Virabyan, the nominal owner of Kuprar RA, was merely a front for the real buyer.

    Photo by Alexander Nrjwolf on Unsplash

    Reality exceeded our expectations. Sokolov did not just gain control over the mine — he turned it into a lever of international influence. In July 2026, the U.S. State Department appointed him chairman of the TRIPP+ enterprise fund — a fund with a budget of more than $200 million, created to manage a strategic transport corridor through the South Caucasus and Central Asia, including Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan.

    According to the TRIPP Implementation Framework published by the U.S. State Department in January 2026, the TRIPP Development Company is granted exclusive rights to plan, design, construct, operate, and maintain the transit infrastructure for an initial term of 49 years, with an optional 50‑year extension. The United States is offered a 74% stake, while Armenia holds 26%. In other words, Sokolov is not just managing a fund — he is chairing the entity that will control a 43‑kilometre corridor through Armenian territory for the next half‑century.

    This is no longer just a deal. It is the transformation of a sanctioned asset into an instrument of American foreign policy, where the main beneficiary is a man who donated an undisclosed sum to Trump’s ballroom project and now stands to shape future transit of strategic resources through the region.

    And this brings us to a question that American citizens have the right to ask: is Trump’s appointee at the State Department still a citizen of the Russian Federation, and if not, could the new U.S. civil servant Konstantin Sokolov confirm that he has formally renounced it?

    The TRIPP project is not a secret. On December 9, 2025, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan officially announced its framework during a speech at the German Society for Foreign Policy in Berlin. He confirmed that Armenia and the United States were in intensive negotiations on the “Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity” and that a joint Armenian-American company, “TRIPP Company,” would be registered in Armenia to develop the necessary infrastructure.

    Pashinyan’s speech explicitly linked the project to Armenia’s broader strategic goals: regional connectivity, the “Crossroads of Peace” initiative, and integration with the Middle Corridor. What he did not say — but what is now abundantly clear — is that the beneficiary of this geopolitical shift is a Russian-born American donor with no prior government experience, who also happens to control Armenia’s second-largest copper mine.

    We predicted that Teghut would be sold to structures linked to Trump. We were not wrong — we simply underestimated the scale. Sokolov did not just get a mine; he got a $200 million government fund, a corridor, and a front-row seat to Armenia’s geopolitical shift to the West. Armenia, in turn, has sold more than just an asset — it has bet its transit future on a new American game. The question of who ultimately pays for this “historic opportunity” remains open.

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  • “Used to. Not Anymore.” — How Virabyan Makes Comedy to Wash Teghut Mine for Sokolov

    July 15, 2026 (Azatutyun.am Investigative Interview)

    VTB Bank wanted to dump the toxic Teghut copper-molybdenum mine. Sanctions had made the asset radioactive. The official line: “bankers shouldn’t dig for copper.”

    So VTB structured a deal that would make a Hollywood screenwriter blush. Enter Sergey Virabyan — a former mid-level government official, a banker who never worked in mining, and a man with no visible assets and no apparent reason to own a $22 billion deposit.

    Here’s how it worked:

    1. The Phantom Frontman. In February 2026, Virabyan registers “Kuprar RA”. He is the sole shareholder and director. The company has no website, no track record, no history.
    2. The Blind Regulator. On July 7, the Competition Protection Commission approves the concentration. It publishes no information about the buyer’s revenue, assets or beneficial owners.
    3. The Houdini Exit. Virabyan had already left the company by June 5 — before the deal was even approved.

    When investigators from Azatutyun asked him who now owns Teghut, the conversation turned into a masterclass of nominee deflection:

    Are you the new owner of Teghut?
    No.

    But you owned Kuprar RA?
    I used to. Not anymore.

    To whom did you transfer your share?
    That is a commercial secret.

    Is Konstantin Sokolov the buyer?
    I cannot say. You are asking commercial things.

    Virabyan’s clumsy interview sounds exactly like this legendary clash of identities in The Big Lebowski. While the public looks at the Teghut registry expecting to see a real, deep-pocketed tycoon (Sokolov), they are instead forced to listen to a shell proxy desperately repeating that he is just a random guy who has nothing to do with the heavy corporate lifting.

    “Let me explain something to you. I am not Mr. Lebowski. You’re Mr. Lebowski. I’m the Dude.”

    Officially, the new owner of Teghut is unknown. Unofficially, everyone in Yerevan’s financial and political circles knows exactly who stands behind the deal.

    Let’s be clear: Sokolov is a man holding at least Russian, American and Maltese passports. He is an international wallet for opaque transactions, a high-tier proxy who sanitises assets that other banks won’t touch. Teghut is not his first Armenian project, and it won’t be his last.

  • Russian Bank Exits Armenia’s Teghut Mine as Investigation Identifies New Controlling Owners

    July 13,2026 (civilnet.am), by Siranush Adamyan

    Russia’s state-owned VTB Bank has sold its stake in Armenia’s Teghut copper and molybdenum mine, ending years of ownership of one of the country’s largest mining assets, according to an investigation by RFE/RL’s Armenian service based on state corporate records, published on Saturday.

    Google Maps, 2026

    The investigation found that the mine’s new ownership structure includes Russian-born U.S. businessman Konstantin Sokolov and companies associated with him. Sokolov co-owns the parent company of Viva Armenia, one of the country’s mobile operators.

    VTB acquired Teghut after its previous owner, Vallex Group, defaulted on about $400 million in loans used to finance the construction of the mining complex. But ownership became increasingly problematic after Western sanctions had been imposed on the Russian lender following Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, disrupting exports and financial transactions for VTB-owned companies.

    Teghut, located in Armenia’s northern Lori province, contains the country’s second-largest copper and molybdenum deposit and is one of Armenia’s biggest taxpayers. The company paid about 14.4 billion drams ($38 million) in taxes last year.

    When VTB took control of the mine in 2018, mining operations had already been suspended over concerns about the mine’s tailings storage facility, leaving more than a thousand employees without work before production resumed under the bank’s ownership in 2019. Later in 2022, operations were disrupted again after the West had imposed sanctions on VTB; production resumed about a year later.

    VTB Chairman Andrey Kostin said in April that the bank was in the “final stages” of selling its stake but did not identify the buyer or disclose the financial terms. The transaction required approval from Armenia’s competition regulator to be completed.

    Credit: https://civilnet.am/en/news/1013051

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  • Halcon Innovation Fund posts 11.94% NAV Drop After AMIO Bank Corrections in 2025

    July 09, 2026

    We have been following the Halcon Investment SICAV (an alternative investment fund (AIF) for professional investors under Liechtenstein law in the legal form of an investment company with variable capital managed by ONE Funds AG) and its connection to AMIO Bank and Konstantin Sokolov—the man behind the newly renamed Sokolov Executive MBA Program at Chicago Booth—for some time now. The connection was first identified in 2024 by Armenian investigators from hetq.am.

    By mid-2026, the annual reports for both Halcon Investment SICAV and AMIO Bank for the year ending December 31, 2025 became publicly available. They contain significant new information that we are now ready to partly analyze.

    Halcon’s 2025 Report: Structural Consolidation and a Major Write-Down

    The most visible change in Halcon’s 2025 annual report is structural. Of the five sub-funds that previously operated under the Halcon Investment SICAV umbrella, four — XTech Investment Fund, Arami Capital Fund, Gingolph Capital Fund, and Antarctic Investment Fund — are now marked as “in liquidation” (i.L.). Only the Halcon Innovation Fund, which stands behind MFM Global AG (subsidiary of Elguma Investment Limited)— the major shareholder of AMIO Bank — remains active. This means all remaining assets and liabilities are now concentrated in a single vehicle.

    BDO (Liechtenstein) AG, a mid-tier international audit network, reported a drop in the fund’s total assets from €118.7 million at the end of 2024 to €93.7 million at the end of 2025. But the more significant disclosure concerns a post-closing adjustment. After the December 31, 2025 reporting date, the fund identified a material error in the valuation of its investment in AMIO Bank. The correction amounted to €24 million, leading to a mandatory restatement of the net asset value.

    The originally reported NAV per unit of €1,650.10 was revised downward to €1,309.94, representing an 11.94% decline in the fund’s value over the course of 2025.

    What Triggered the Correction: AMIO Bank’s 2025 Report

    The correction in Halcon’s accounts was not an independent event. It was triggered by the 2025 financial statements of AMIO Bank itself, audited by Baker Tilly Armenia, a member of the Baker Tilly International network, one of the top eight global accounting networks.

    In Note 3.4 of its report, titled “Changes in Accounting Policy and Presentation / Error correction,” the bank formally acknowledged a major retrospective error. The misstatements related to two critical areas: the fair value assessment of foreclosed properties and the calculation of expected credit losses on loans for periods prior to 2023.

    The cumulative effect was substantial. As of December 31, 2023, the bank’s retained earnings were restated downward by 23.55 billion Armenian drams (approximately $58.9 million at the 31.12.2025 exchange rate of 1 USD = 399.82 AMD) — from a loss of 20.3 billion drams (approximately $50.8 million) to a loss of 43.9 billion drams (approximately $109.8 million).

    The 2025 report also confirms a capital replenishment of 20 billion Armenian drams (approximately $50 million), registered by the Central Bank of Armenia in February 2025. This appears to be a move to meet regulatory capital requirements — a detail worth noting as we continue to examine the bank’s financial trajectory.

    This is not a minor adjustment; it is a comprehensive rewrite of prior years’ financials. And it raises an obvious question: these are not random accounting errors. The pattern is familiar — we have seen this before. In 2021, before the change in ownership, Armbusinessbank (as AMIO Bank was then known) recorded a significant income tax refund that inflated its balance sheet and improved its apparent financial health. This accounting maneuver — effectively a bookkeeping benefit — made the bank look more attractive to prospective buyers. After the ownership changed, the benefit was reversed, and the bank had to recognize a corresponding tax expense. That previous correction, like this one, involved material adjustments to reported earnings and served to improve the bank’s valuation at a critical moment.

    According to Note 16 of the bank’s 2025 financial statements, AMIO Bank exhibits a high concentration of credit risk, with AMD 159,721,076 thousand (approximately $399.5 million at the 31.12.2025 exchange rate) due from just its ten largest third-party borrowers and their related parties.

    Furthermore, in Note 2 (“Business Environment”) of the AMIO Bank report, management — led by Chairman Gevorg Tarumyan — formally acknowledged external geopolitical risks. The bank stated that the U.S. and Israeli military strikes on Iran of February 28, 2026, could have consequences for Armenia’s economy and the banking sector. Given these factors, is a further decline in valuation anticipated?

    A Bridge to the Next Investigation

    The 2025 reports raise several questions that we will address in the upcoming articles of this series.

    First, the fund’s portfolio structure has changed significantly. New non-banking investments were made to a lifestyle business hotel near Zurich Airport — a connection we first suggested in February 2026. At the same time, the fund’s management has explicitly highlighted its real estate projects in Cyprus as a core investment focus, and details have become clearer.

    Second, the fund has introduced two new share classes — HIF-EUR1M and HIF-DIRECT — effective April 16, 2026. The fund also updated its Liquidity Management Tools and added a clause on Redemption in kind. These changes raise questions about the fund’s strategy and target investor base.

    Third, we will examine the role of Blue Water Capital Management Limited in Halcon Innovation Fund management, the Hong Kong-based portfolio manager, and its connection to Dr. Zhe Zhang, a key figure who has repeatedly surfaced as a frontman for American businessman Konstantin Sokolov.

    We will address these questions in the next articles of this series. And perhaps, as we do, we might pose a broader question to the students of Konstantin Sokolov’s Executive MBA Program in Chicago: “If the numbers change after the deal is done, were they ever real in the first place?”

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  • Buyer of MTS’s Armenian Subsidiary Acquires Rostelecom Asset in Country

    July 07, 2026 YEREVAN (Interfax)

    Cyprus’s Fedilco Group Limited (the Viva Armenia brand) has concluded a deal to acquire 100% of the shares of the Armenian subsidiary telecom operator GNC-Alfa (represented in Armenia under the trade name OVIO) from Rostelecom , the press service of the Cypriot company said.

    In July 2025, the Armenian Public Services Regulatory Commission allowed Rostelecom to sell 100% of the shares of its subsidiary GNC-Alfa to the new owner of CJSC MTS Armenia – Fedilco Group Limited.

    “The deal is a strategic step in the development of Viva Armenia and is aimed at the company forming a full-fledged convergent platform that unites mobile communications, fixed internet, television, telecommunications transport infrastructure, and digital services into a single ecosystem,” the company said.

    In January 2024, PJSC MTS announced the sale of 100% of the shares of CJSC MTS Armenia (operating under the brand Viva-MTS), as well as the payment system CJSC MobiDram (a 100% subsidiary of CJSC MTS Armenia) to Fedilco Group Limited. In March 2024, the brand Viva-MTS was changed to Viva Armenia.

    The owners of Fedilco Group Limited, registered in Cyprus, are European and Asian investors, with the ultimate beneficiaries being Zhe Zhang and Konstantin Sokolov.

    In 2024, Fedilco Group Limited transferred 20% of its shares to Armenia on a gratuitous basis.

    GNC-Alfa (CJSC GNC-Alfa) is one of the leading telecommunications operators in Armenia, providing broadband internet access, IPTV, and fixed telephony services for individuals and corporate clients.

    Credit: https://interfax.com/newsroom/top-stories/118322/

  • Masons of Gibraltar Behind the Rock’s Largest Local Project?

    July 02, 2026

    In the close-knit community of Gibraltar, where personal connections often carry significant weight, a major £1.8 billion data centre project has brought attention to local representation.

    Pelagos Data Centres / Northern Pillar Energy, led by investor Konstantin Sokolov, has appointed Christian J. A. Ryan as President for Gibraltar Operations. In November 2025, Ryan participated in a meeting with Donald Trump Jr. in Gibraltar, discussing the Pelagos project. The meeting was held at the offices of Hassans International Law Firm.

    His photographs from official project events closely match those on his personal Facebook profile, where he appears with his wife and children as a family man from Gibraltar.

    The Official Biography

    According to the company’s website, Christian J. A. Ryan brings extensive experience in design and construction management, particularly in the defence sector. The bio states he joined the UK Ministry of Defence in 2005, worked with SERCO Defence, INTERSERVE Defence, and MITIE Defence, participated in post-earthquake assessments in Nepal in 2015, and held oversight roles in MOD estate maintenance until 2024. He is also credited with a Bachelor’s degree from the University of Greenwich.

    However, despite thorough searches across public records, news archives, and professional databases, no independent verification of these professional milestones has been found outside the Northern Pillar Energy website itself.

    The Family Connection

    What is well documented is Christian’s family background. On the Facebook page of Alfred Ryan, Christian Ryan (The middle initial ‘A’ in Christian J. A. Ryan almost certainly stands for Alfred), in keeping with the common British tradition of sons receiving their father’s name as a middle name) is listed as his son. The two profiles are directly connected.

    Alfred Ryan’s page also shows “Masonic Network” as one of his liked pages — appearing prominently among his interests.

    The District Grand Lodge of Gibraltar

    The District Grand Lodge of Gibraltar, operating under the United Grand Lodge of England, is one of the oldest and most historically significant overseas Masonic districts, with roots dating back to the early 18th century and playing a notable role in the English Masonic tradition abroad.

    Alfred Henry Ryan himself is a long-standing figure in Gibraltar:

    • Fact #1. While a direct document explicitly linking the cemetery superintendent’s position to his full name could not be retrieved, a search query on the official Gibraltar Government website confirms that records of ‘Alfred Henry Ryan’ were previously hosted on their cemetery contact pages. He served as Superintendent / Records Superintendent of North Front Cemetery for 50 years, retiring in August 2020. In the 2021 Budget Speech, Minister John Cortes stated:

    “I must also pay tribute and thank the former cemetery superintendent, Alfred Ryan, who retired in August 2020 after 50 years of service and dedication to our community.”

    https://www.facebook.com/GibFreemasonry

    Significance of the Masonic Role

    In a small jurisdiction like Gibraltar, the position of District Grand Master carries considerable social and networking influence within the local establishment. The fraternity has deep historical roots on the Rock, dating back centuries, and often intersects with business, government, and community leadership circles.

    No Conclusions, Just Facts

    The visual match between Christian Ryan’s official appearances and his personal Facebook profile, as well as between the man pictured on the Masonic lodge website and Alfred Ryan’s Facebook presence, is consistent. However, we cannot state with absolute certainty that the individual in the Masonic lodge photograph is Alfred Henry Ryan, nor that Alfred Ryan is definitively the father of Christian Ryan. In the absence of official documentation confirming the relationship — such as a birth certificate or a direct statement from the individuals involved — these remain strong indications, not proven facts.

    We present these verified connections not as accusations, but as context worth noting. In Gibraltar, where everyone seems to know everyone, such links are rarely surprising — yet they remain relevant when a foreign-led multi-billion project selects its primary local representative.

    The reader can decide what weight to give these overlapping facts.

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  • The Legal Architects: Hassans and the Inner Circle

    June 25, 2026

    No major project moves in Gibraltar without the machinery of Hassans International Law Firm, the territory’s dominant legal player. Three names are particularly relevant.

    According to former Gibraltar lawyer Robert Vasquez, three key figures from Hassans are visible in the official photographs surrounding the Pelagos Data Centre announcement: Fabian Picardo (Chief Minister and former Hassans partner), Tony Provasoli (Hassans consultant), and James Levy CBE KC (Hassans senior partner).

    The Pelagos Data Centres launch event, 4 September 2025. Pictured (from left to right): Tony Provasoli, Joe Bossano, Fabian Picardo, Konstantin Sokolov, Christian Ryan, James Levy. (Source: HM Government of Gibraltar)

    Fabian Picardo, the Chief Minister who announced the Pelagos project, is not a politician who occasionally consults lawyers. He is a lawyer. Before entering politics, Picardo was a partner at Hassans for a decade. He remains a barrister. But his role in the Pelagos project must be read against the backdrop of the McGrail Inquiry (December 2025). The McGrail Inquiry sharply criticised Picardo’s conduct, describing aspects of his intervention as “grossly improper” and “sinister” when he summoned the police commissioner to his office in a “frenzy of rage” — specifically to protect James Levy from a search warrant. The judge concluded that Picardo was acting not for Gibraltar’s reputation, but “to protect Mr Levy, his lifelong friend and mentor.”

    Tony Provasoli, a consultant at Hassans, has been the legal adviser to the Gibraltar Government on privatisations and telecoms. He has also acted for Gibtelecom. The man who wrote the rules on telecoms and state assets is now positioned to advise a data centre that needs both. Unlike Picardo and Levy, Provasoli does not appear in the McGrail scandal. But his role is quietly more important: he knows exactly how Gibraltar’s regulatory framework operates because he helped shape parts of it.

    Then there is James Levy CBE KC, the firm’s senior partner. Levy is not a lawyer. He is the lawyer. He advised the government on developing Gibraltar as a finance centre, on anti-money laundering legislation, and on banking and insurance laws. He is described in legal directories as “a once-in-a-generation lawyer” and “the quintessential solution provider”. In plain English, if a project requires a legal framework to be expanded, amended, or interpreted in novel ways, Levy is the man. But his name also appears in the McGrail Inquiry. The police obtained a search warrant for Hassans offices in connection with an alleged conspiracy to misappropriate a national security contract. Levy was a beneficiary of the company (36 North Limited) that bid for that contract — while Picardo, as Chief Minister, was in a position to influence the outcome. Levy was formally eliminated from the suspect list in October 2020. But the stain remains.

    The Pelagos Data Centres is not just an engineering challenge. It is a legal and political construction. Picardo provides the political cover. Provasoli manages the regulatory plumbing. Levy solves the intractable problems. The renders come from UPP. The enabling architecture comes from Hassans.

    For US/Armenia/Russia businessman Konstantin Sokolov, this is the dream team. Picardo can open doors that remain closed to most applicants.  Provasoli knows every regulatory shortcut. Levy has a reputation for finding solutions to problems others consider impossible.

    What Hassans Will Likely Solve for Pelagos

    A project of this size cannot happen in Gibraltar without legal engineering. Here is what Fabian Picardo, Tony Provasoli, and James Levy bring to the table.

    1. Land where there is no land

    The renders show buildings on marine columns. Legally, this is not “land” in the traditional sense. Territorial waters are Crown land, not private property. The government can grant a marine lease or a concession over the seabed without a public tender. No demolition costs. No compensation to existing tenants. No land acquisition budget. Hassans knows exactly which clauses in the 2009 Development Plan are silent about “construction over water” — and how to make use of that silence.

    2. Tax incentives without parliamentary debate

    Gibraltar already offers attractive corporate tax rates (12.5% standard). But for a £1.8 billion investment, Pelagos will expect more — definitely much less. Hassans can structure the project as a “qualifying company” under Gibraltar’s tax laws, potentially reducing the effective rate. They have done this before for gaming companies and financial institutions.

    Gibraltar did not become home to Bet365, 888, William Hill and dozens of other gaming operators by accident. The legal framework was deliberately built to attract them. Readers may also recall that Konstantin Sokolov is not entirely unfamiliar with the gaming industry. In 2025, the SPAC on whose board he served completed the acquisition of Gamehaus, a publisher of casino-style slot and bingo games previously examined by this archive.

    The enabling legislation already exists. It just needs to be applied — quietly, through administrative guidance rather than a public vote.

    3. Quiet insertion into the Development Plan

    The new Gibraltar Development Plan was promised for 2025 but has not appeared. Perfect timing. When it finally emerges, the North Mole Industrial Park zone may have been reclassified to permit “high-tech infrastructure” or “strategic energy facilities” — language that conveniently covers a 250MW data centre. Potentially limiting the scope of public consultation required if it is framed as a “technical correction”. Levy has advised the government on planning law for decades. He knows which paragraphs to rewrite and who to ask.

    4. Aviation height exemption

    The 25-metre limit exists. But Waterport Terrace (9 storeys) already exceeds it. The 48-metre residential tower was approved after an aeronautical study. Hassans will help Pelagos commission its own study, hire the right consultants, and present the findings to the Development & Planning Commission. The precedent is set. The legal path is cleared. Provasoli has sat on government boards. He understands the decision-making process better than most.

    5. Fast-tracked permitting without public scrutiny

    The Government Development Projects website contains no information about Pelagos. That is not an oversight. Hassans can advise Pelagos to submit applications under commercial confidentiality provisions, bypassing the normal public register. The first time residents learn about the project may be when construction barges arrive. By then, it will be too late to object.

    6. Energy supply without competition

    Pelagos needs power. The North Mole Power Station is state-owned. Hassans can structure a private wire arrangement or a long-term PPA that never goes to tender. “Off-grid” in the press release means “connected directly to the state power plant without going through the retail market”. Provasoli has advised the government on privatisations. He knows how to write contracts that comply with procurement rules while achieving the desired outcome.

    7. Zero or minimal import duties on equipment

    A 250MW data centre requires thousands of tonnes of equipment: generators, cooling systems, servers, batteries, transformers, liquid cooling infrastructure, electrical switchgear. Gibraltar is not a manufacturing centre. Almost everything will be imported. Standard customs duties would add millions to the project cost.

    Hassans can structure the project under Gibraltar’s “qualifying company” regime or negotiate a bespoke duty suspension agreement with the government. The legal basis already exists: Gibraltar’s Customs and Excise Act allows for duty relief on goods imported for approved industrial or strategic projects. The Chief Minister’s office can designate Pelagos as such a project — quietly, without legislation. No parliamentary vote required. Just an administrative decision. Provasoli has advised the government on exactly these mechanisms.

    8. Streamlined work permits for foreign technicians

    Building and operating a 250MW data centre requires specialists Gibraltar does not have: electrical engineers with HVDC experience, cooling system designers, AI infrastructure architects. Hassans can negotiate a fast-track work permit system for Pelagos personnel. Potentially simplified recruitment and immigration procedures for specialist personnel.  Just a letter from the government confirming “strategic importance”. Levy has advised on immigration rules for financial services. The same template applies.

    9. Exemption from energy efficiency regulations (irony intended)

    The project promises a PUE of 1.2, which is excellent. But if it fails to meet that target, Hassans can ensure there are no penalties. Gibraltar’s building regulations include energy performance standards. But “strategic infrastructure” can be exempted. The same legal mechanism used for the North Mole Power Station itself can be applied to Pelagos. Regulate the competition, exempt the favoured project.

    10. Confidentiality orders on all planning documents

    No information about Pelagos exists on the Government Development Projects website. That is not an accident. Hassans can secure a non-publication order for all planning applications, citing “commercial sensitivity” or “national security” (data centres are critical infrastructure). The public never sees the environmental impact assessment. Never reads the aeronautical study. Never learns about the seabed lease terms. Transparency laws exist. Exemptions also exist. Levy knows exactly which box to tick.

    11. Limitation of liability

    When — not if — something fails, Pelagos does not want to face full lawsuits. Hassans can negotiate a statutory cap on liability or a government-backed indemnity, limiting payouts to a token amount. Levy has extensive experience drafting complex government and commercial agreements. The government will not let a lawsuit kill a £1.8 billion project.

    In our next article, we will take a closer look at the man who runs Gibraltar operations for Konstantin Sokolov — a figure whose public résumé is thin, but whose local connections run deep.

    Credits:

  • The Trump Ballroom: How Konstantin Sokolov’s $10M ‘Investment’ Became a $600M Taxpayer Trap

    June 23, 2026

    This past week, both The Washington Post and The Guardian dropped bombshell investigations revealing the true cost of Trump’s White House ballroom. So, you know we’re keeping a close eye on the White House construction site not because we care about architecture, but because our favorite Chicago entrepreneur, Konstantin Sokolov, has skin in this game. According to the donor list, he’s one of the “generous American patriots” who threw money at Trump’s dream ballroom — we estimate his contribution at around $10 million.

    You’d think this is philanthropy. Maybe a civic-minded gesture to restore a historic wing. But let’s be real: this isn’t charity. It’s a cynical down payment on Trump family loyalty. In Trump’s Washington, you don’t donate to a building — you buy a seat at the table. And Sokolov, like Meta, Coinbase, and Lockheed Martin, clearly wanted a chair.

    The most accurate White House ballroom rendering available at the moment.

    Source: u/DumbledoresAtheist, r/washingtondc, Reddit. Available at: https://www.reddit.com/r/washingtondc/comments/1u7xk1g/my_friend_built_the_lego_white_house/#lightbox

    The Construction Is a Done Deal (Unlike Sokolov’s Other Projects)

    Here’s the first irony: the East Wing is already rubble. They demolished it in October 2025, long before any permits were finalized. And despite court rulings, congressional outrage, and a federal judge calling the scheme a “Rube Goldberg contraption” — this ballroom WILL be finished.

    Why? Because it cannot remain a hole in the ground. Unlike, say, 100% of Sokolov’s own projects that exist only on paper or in bankruptcy filings, this one has the full weight of the presidency behind it. The White House cannot afford a half-demolished wing and a half-built ballroom. It’s a matter of prestige — and a very visible monument to Trump’s ego.

    The Price Tag: From $200M to $600M (and Climbing)

    Let’s recap the numbers, because they’re comedy gold:

    • July 2025: Trump promises a $200M ballroom, “100% privately funded.”
    • March 2026: The estimate doubles to $400M. Trump swears: “Not 10 cents from taxpayers.”
    • June 2026 (Washington Post leak): Internal Clark Construction documents reveal the real cost is $600M**. Of that, only **$293M comes from private donors — the rest ($307M) is public money from Secret Service and military office budgets.
    • June 18, 2026 (Guardian scoop): The administration quietly shifts $352M from Secret Service funds — money legally designated for personnel and training — into the construction account. The White House calls it “security upgrades.”

    So much for “no taxpayer money.” They just renamed the piggy bank.

    The Sokolov Paradox: A $10M Down Payment for… What?

    Now here’s the punchline for our hero. Sokolov and his fellow “patriots” are paying for the privilege of being called donors, while the American taxpayer is footing 60% of the actual bill. His $10M is a drop in a $600M bucket — but it buys him access, a photo op, and a line in the history books.

    But here’s the bitter twist: Trump still needs more private cash. The project is bleeding money. Estimates keep rising. The administration can only raid so many federal accounts before Congress (even the spineless one) pushes back. So they’ll go back to the donor list. They’ll squeeze Sokolov and his peers for more. Because the ballroom must be finished — and preferably before the 2028 election.

    The Moral of This Fairy Tale

    You pay $1 to get in the door — but it costs $2 to stay in the room.

    Sokolov, alongside Meta, Coinbase, Lockheed Martin and the rest of Trump’s patriotic donor class, may view these contributions as a form of political insurance. Not insurance against fire, floods, or earthquakes. Insurance against bureaucrats asking inconvenient questions.

    But here’s the final irony: American taxpayers are already paying for 60% of this farce. And when the project inevitably goes over budget again — which it will — the government will simply collect more taxes, audit more rich people, and squeeze more money from the very donors who thought they were buying immunity.

    You can’t bribe the federal government with a $10M donation to a ballroom. The government will just take your money, take the taxpayers’ money, and then come back for more — all while smiling and calling you a “patriot.”

    So, Konstantin, how’s that investment working out? The rubble is gone, the foundation is being laid, and somewhere in the fine print, your $10M is now part of a $600M construction site that you, your fellow donors, and every American family will be paying for, one way or another.

    Welcome to the Trump ballroom — where the only thing more inflated than the budget is the promise of loyalty.

    Credits:

  • Pelagos Data Centre: The Three-Legged Stool

    June 19, 2026

    A data centre of the scale proposed by Pelagos needs three things: connectivity, space, and power. A 250MW facility of this size requires access to major international broadband capacity, not just local networks. The renders show a 250MW campus. The numbers show a project that does not add up. Let’s examine each of the three legs.

    By Nathan Harig – Picasa, CC BY-SA 3.0, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=9340803

    Connectivity: The One Thing That Works

    Ensuring direct and immediate access to a high-capacity fibre-optic cable is a critical prerequisite for the project’s infrastructure. Less than one kilometre from the proposed Pelagos location, the Europe India Gateway (EIG) submarine cable branches into Gibraltar. This is not a minor regional link. It is a 15,000-kilometre fibre-optic network spanning three continents, with a total capacity of 28 Terabits per second. The cable connects Gibraltar westward to the UK via Portugal, and eastward to France (Marseille), Monaco, and on to India.

    The landing station of the Europe India Gateway (EIG) submarine cable at Ocean Village in the Bay of Gibraltar is managed by Gibtelecom, the national provider. Gibtelecom is a founder member of the EIG consortium and the only operator in Gibraltar with direct ownership and access to the system. Consequently, the successful realization of the Pelagos project is entirely dependent on establishing a close and strategic partnership with Gibtelecom.

    Space: 250MW on 9,000 Square Metres

    In the previous article, “Pelagos Data Centre: Built on Water,” we analysed publicly available renders, maps and site photographs and estimated the usable footprint at approximately 9,000 square metres. How much space does a modern data centre need? Industry benchmarks from real projects show the following density metrics:

    ProjectPowerBuilding AreaDensity (kW/sqm)
    Start Campus, Portugal (one building)90 MW~45,000 sqm2.0 kW/sqm 
    Merlin Properties, Madrid20 MW (phase 1)~43,000 sqm (full campus)up to 2.3 kW/sqm 
    CloudHQ Paris160 MW~65,000 sqm2.4 kW/sqm
    Ark Alliance, London75 MW~42,000 sqm1.8 kW/sqm

    The industry range is between 1.8 and 2.4 kW per square metre. The average is approximately 2.1 kW/sqm. Apply that average to Pelagos.

    Applying an average density of approximately 2.1 kW/sqm derived from comparable projects suggests a requirement of roughly 119,000 sqm.

    British and European standards (notably BS EN 50600-2-1) define the clear height — the usable space inside the server room.

    The total height from floor to floor (slab-to-slab) is built from three layers: a raised floor for air and cables (0.6–1.0 metres), the clear server space (3.0–4.0 metres), and overhead space for pipes and cables (0.9–1.5 metres).

    The final requirements are straightforward:

    • Small server rooms: minimum 4.5 metres total.
    • Standard commercial data centres: 5.0–5.5 metres.
    • High-density AI / hyperscale facilities: up to 6.0 metres per floor.

    For a project like Pelagos, which claims to compete in the hyperscale market, 5 metres per floor is the baseline industry standard — not an exaggeration. Anything less would force them to abandon standard rack layouts or risk overheating.

    Based on a 9,000-square-metre footprint, a building with a standard industrial floor height of 5 metres per level would require 13 storeys. This translates into a 65-metre industrial skyscraper—equivalent to an 18-to-22-storey residential building. Construction of this magnitude and height is unprecedented for the territory of Gibraltar.

     In 2015, when the North Mole gas station was designed, the aviation authority imposed a hard 25-metre limit on the chimney stack. The official document states: “The stacks will be 25 m in height, abiding to height limits imposed for the operation of the Gibraltar International Airport.”

    But there are precedents. Waterport Terrace residential complex is 9 storeys — approximately 27–32 metres — and is already built and occupied. In December 2019, the Development & Planning Commission approved a 15–16 storey residential tower (48 metres) on Devil’s Tower Road after an aeronautical study. The vote was 10 in favour, 1 against.

    Height restrictions are currently regulated under the Town Planning Act 2018 and the 2009 Development Plan. A new Development Plan was promised for 2025 but has not appeared. When it does, rules may be revised. But in Gibraltar, almost everything is negotiable if you have the right legal team and political support.  

    Power: 250MW vs. 15-30MW

    Pelagos claims it will be “powered independently from Gibraltar’s grid using a mix of renewable energy and LNG.” The LNG points directly to the North Mole Power Station — the state-owned, state-operated plant that is Gibraltar’s only source of electricity.

    Let us do the math properly, including the industry reality of PUE. The project promises a PUE of 1.2. That means for every 1 MW of IT load, the facility requires 1.2 MW of total electrical power. The remaining 0.2 MW goes to cooling, UPS losses, transformers, and lighting.

    The full 250 MW IT load requires 300 MW of total power.

    Now look at what Gibraltar actually has.

    • North Mole Power Station total capacity: ~86 MW
    • Gibraltar’s peak demand (city + industry): ~36 MW daily peak.
    • Required operating reserve for the city: 20% of peak load = ~7.2 MW.
    • Available power for a new commercial user before its own reserve: 86 – 36 – 7.2 = ~42.8 MW.
    • But the data centre itself also requires reserve. A constant 250 MW load is not flexible. Even for a modest first phase, the operator must maintain 20% reserve. That is ~8.6 MW of the 42.8 MW available.
    • Net available power for IT load: 86 – 36 – 7.2 – 8.6 = ~34.2 MW total power.
    • With a PUE of 1.2, that supports ~28 MW of IT load.

    A first-phase IT load of 28 MW would represent the maximum real capacity under current grid constraints, a figure that would effectively exhaust all available power surplus from the North Mole Power Station. In reality, operational deployment could scale anywhere from an initial 1 MW. To put this in perspective, Gibraltar’s existing data centres are internal facilities with modest footprints, each requiring less than 3 MW to operate. For instance, Continent 8 operates at approximately 2–3 MW, while Rockolo runs at around 2.1 MW. We estimate the total combined capacity of all existing data centres in Gibraltar to be roughly 6–8 MW. If the first phase remains small and incremental, it might prove viable within the local grid constraints. But scaling to the full, proposed 250 MW? That is an entirely different story.

    The Bottom Line

    • Internet: Available. The EIG cable is less than one kilometre away. Pelagos needs to negotiate with Gibtelecom .
    • Space: Enough for one building, one phase, if the phase is modest. Not enough for 250 MW unless you build a 65-metre skyscraper under the flight path. Height limits are negotiable, but precedent has limits. Building a skyscraper of this scale on reclaimed land (waterfront), within an extremely confined site and adjacent to an active runway, is highly unrealistic from both an engineering and operational standpoint.
    • Power: Less than 34 MW of spare electrical capacity exists. That supports a first phase of just under 28 MW IT load — not 50 MW, and certainly not 250 MW.

    In upcoming articles, we will investigate who is pushing the Pelagos project for Konstantin Sokolov — and where the independent 300 MW of electricity required for the data centre is expected to come from. Stay tuned.

    Credits:

    • North Mole Power Station / Gibraltar energy supply — reference for Gibraltar’s installed generation capacity and local power context. https://www.gea.gi/gea/who-we-are