August 06, 2026
According to the pitch book for the Gotthard Investment Fund 2015 a Liechtenstein-based fund for professional investors (a critical update: the fund was subsequently liquidated in July 2020, with Ernst & Young approving its final closing balance sheet), managed by VP Fund Solutions AG – Konstantin Sokolov served as Vice Chairman and managing partner at Gotthard Investment AG in Switzerland, alongside his Swiss partner Roland Raeber. Together, they acted as Fund Managers of Gotthard Investment Fund / Gotthard Umbrella Fund signing off on all the fund’s transactions.
Today, for an American citizen and a close associate of Donald Trump, direct affiliation with a European fund is no longer comme il faut. New projects require new partners and new instruments.
In early 2024, we republished HETQ.AM’s investigation into the new owners of MTS Armenia. That investigation first revealed Sokolov’s new partner: the Chinese entrepreneur Zhe Zhang, and his connection to the management of Halcon Investment SICAV through SIFT Capital Partners Limited. That fund, in turn, controls AMIO Bank via the Cypriot company Elguma Investment Ltd. and Swiss MFM Global AG.
The Switch: SIFT out, Blue Water in
In the publicly available reports for 2024 and 2025, SIFT Capital Partners Limited is no longer listed as the portfolio manager for Halcon Investment Fund. In its place: Blue Water Capital Management Limited.
Did Zhe Zhang simply disappear? We think not. Blue Water Capital Management Limited, with its CEO Michael Stockford, is closely tied to Zhang – and, through him, to Sokolov.
What did Blue Water do for Halcon Innovation Fund investors in 2025?
The 2025 Halcon report includes a notification that the delegated portfolio manager changed its name from Redbridge Capital Management Limited to Blue Water Capital Management Limited.
The fee structure is revealing. According to Halcon’s 2025 accounts, Blue Water’s total remuneration was HKD 7.237 million (≈ USD 928,000). Within that, the “Asset Management & Investment Advisory” fee specifically for the Halcon Innovation Fund was €305,729 – a reasonable and transparent charge.
Blue Water also signed two major loan agreements in 2025 on behalf of Halcon: €13.7 million to MFM Global Invest AG (seemingly for the acquisition of a Swiss hotel) and €24.9 million to Remido Holdings Ltd – both entities connected to the wider Sokolov–Zhang ecosystem, as we previously covered.
Effective 16 April 2026, the fund introduced two new unit classes as follows: HIF-EUR1M — for large institutional investors (minimum €1 million) — and HIF-DIRECT, a direct class for retail or qualified investors.
Alongside these, the fund also adapted its Liquidity Management Tools to comply with new European regulations, which include a redemption-in-kind option.These changes may look like standard regulatory housekeeping. But they quietly give the manager new tools that can shift the rules of the game. New investors could find themselves locked into less favorable redemption terms, or — in the case of redemption-in-kind — receive assets instead of cash when they try to exit. In a fund already opaque and heavily invested in illiquid projects, this adds another layer of unpredictability for newcomers.
What Blue Water Capital Management actually does
According to its website, Blue Water works exclusively with Professional Investors as defined under Hong Kong’s Securities and Futures Ordinance (individuals with at least HKD 8 million – roughly USD 1 million – in securities). It holds SFC licences Type 4 (advising on securities) and Type 9 (asset management), registration BAU760, and operates under Hong Kong law.
Blue Water does not manage the fund directly. It acts as a delegated portfolio manager. Its direct client is not the end-investor in Liechtenstein, but the fund’s management company – ONE Funds AG (registered in Liechtenstein). ONE Funds AG, as a licensed AIFM, hires Blue Water to manage the Halcon Innovation Fund portfolio. Crucially, Blue Water signs all decisions and contracts on behalf of the fund – a standard practice for such delegated structures.
The Hatcher Group deal: Stockford and Zhang help Tanner consolidate control
In early 2025, a deal on Hong Kong’s GEM exchange would have gone unnoticed – if not for its architecture. Hatcher Group Limited – a boutique consultancy specialising in taking Chinese mainland companies public – changed its controlling shareholder. Formally, through a standard rights issue. Informally, through a three-party operation where each participant played a distinct role.
Hatcher Group is not a financial giant. It is a boutique firm with 100–150 employees, formerly known as VBG International Holdings. Its business: guiding mainland companies through the Hong Kong listing process – IPO advisory, M&A, corporate finance, ESG reporting. Listing was a pragmatic step, giving it access to public capital and strengthening client trust.
That same public status made Hatcher Group a target.
The buyer was Tanner Enterprises, controlled by Hong Kong businessman Li Man Keung Edwin. His goal: to increase his stake from 10.62% to a controlling position. The instrument: a rights issue with underwriting.
Tanner agreed to buy any shares not taken up by existing shareholders. The risk was obvious: if the market didn’t support the deal, Tanner would get the company – but at a full price. If someone else tried to intercept the package, Tanner would get nothing.
To rule out the second scenario, Michael Stockford was brought in – founder of Redbridge Capital Management Limited (later renamed Blue Water Capital). Stockford became an executive director of Hatcher Group on 1 October 2024. His companies served two roles: fund manager for the subscriber and placing agent for unsubscribed shares – at zero commission.
The crucial element, however, was SIFT Capital Partners Limited – the Hong Kong asset manager founded by Zhe Zhang. SIFT subscribed to convertible bonds in Hatcher Group worth HKD 5.67 million, convertible into 18 million shares (up to 42% of the company). Formally, this was an independent transaction. In practice, it was a safety net.
As long as SIFT held the bonds, any outsider eyeing control knew that Zhang could convert at any moment and dilute their stake. This wasn’t a blocker – it was a deterrent. And it worked in Tanner’s favour.
When the rights issue closed, Tanner Enterprises had taken 65 million unsubscribed shares, raising its stake to 48.63%. Consolidation was complete. SIFT never converted – the bonds were never needed. Stockford stayed on the board, and his Redbridge soon rebranded to Blue Water Capital Management.
Official documents from the Hong Kong Stock Exchange (HKEX) – the Hatcher Group Circular dated 10 January 2025 – neatly separate the participants: Zhang as the subscriber’s ultimate beneficial owner, Stockford as the owner of the management company, Tanner as the underwriter. There are no formal ties between them. But the logic of the deal suggests otherwise: three parties, synchronised in one process, with one goal – transferring control of a public company.
This is not collusion in the legal sense. It is a coordinated operation, where everyone knew their role. And the coincidences – the rebranding of Redbridge at the same time as the deal closed – are at the very least significant.
After reading this brief account, one thing becomes clear: Blue Water Capital is far from a stranger to the shareholders of VIVA Armenia and AMIO Bank. It couldn’t be otherwise. The chain is consistent: Sokolov’s old Swiss structure, Zhang’s SIFT Capital, Stockford’s Blue Water – they all converge around the same assets. The rebranding, the appointments, the loans, the consolidation – all point to a stable, if informal, network operating across jurisdictions, from Liechtenstein to Hong Kong, via Cyprus and Armenia.
Disclaimer & Forward-Looking Analysis: This article is for informational and educational purposes only and does not constitute legal, financial, or regulatory advice. All findings, linkages, and conclusions presented herein represent the authors’ analytical opinions, derived solely from the chronological correlation of verified dates, cross-border corporate filings, and publicly available disclosures from the Hong Kong Stock Exchange (HKEX) and the Liechtenstein Financial Market Authority (FMA). Unless explicitly cited from official regulatory documents, any inferences regarding parallel intent, nominee status, or informal networks are speculative hypotheses intended to stimulate public interest and independent analysis. This material does not accuse any mentioned individual or corporate entity of legal non-compliance, regulatory violations, or market collusion.