K. Sokolov Archive

Tag: Zhe Zhang

  • Phantom Northern Pillar: The Missing Energy Cable from Morocco for Pelagos Data Centres

    August 13, 2026

    Gibraltar’s £1.8 billion Pelagos Data Centres — the largest infrastructure investment in the territory’s history — is backed by the government and funded by private capital. But its power source remains a matter of speculation, and the evidence suggests a project built on narrative rather than engineering reality.

    Pelagos Data Centres, announced in September 2025, promises a 250 MW campus on a 20,000 sq m site near the Port of Gibraltar, with the first phase due to become operational in late 2027. The facility is designed to be entirely off-grid, powered by a combination of renewable energy and liquefied natural gas. The project is backed by the Gibraltar Government, with Chief Minister Fabian Picardo describing it as a “massive investment” that will benefit the whole community.

    But the question that has hung over the project from the start is where the power will come from. The answer, according to the project’s chairman, Konstantin Sokolov and Christian Ryan, President for Gibraltar Operations, is Northern Pillar Energy — a consortium that claims to be developing a 4.2 GW solar-to-subsea-cable project connecting Morocco to Gibraltar, with fibre-optic capacity of up to 300 Tbps and a scheduled construction start in 2026.

    The problem is that the deeper one looks, the less substance there is to the claim. Northern Pillar Energy is, in effect, a consortium without members — no public list of participants, no disclosed investors, and no verifiable contracts.

    A BESS Developer, not a Сable Builder

    The energy project’s only named partner is KX Power, a UK-registered asset manager of utility-scale battery energy storage systems. According to UK corporate filings, KX Power Limited is a micro-entity with 10 employees, total assets of £14.9 million and cash in bank of £9.56 million. Its CEO is Dr. Zhe Zhang, a long-standing business partner of Konstantin Sokolov, mentioned in our blog many times. KX Power does not disclose its investors; its ultimate parent is registered in the British Virgin Islands.

    KX Power’s actual business is developing and managing utility-scale battery energy storage (BESS) systems. The company builds grid-scale batteries that provide frequency response, flexibility, and stabilisation services to the UK’s National Grid . Its portfolio includes an 80 MW/160 MWh project at Immingham, a 250 MW/500 MWh project in Scotland , and a joint venture with BlackRock backed by up to £200 million . A recent project was subject to a national security review by the UK government under the National Security and Investment Act, underscoring the sensitivity of its ownership structure.

    None of this relates to subsea HVDC cables. BESS is a short-duration, localised technology — batteries discharge for minutes to hours, providing flexibility within a single grid. A 4.2 GW intercontinental cable, by contrast, is a long-distance, high-capacity transmission asset requiring multi-billion-dollar supply chain commitments: cable manufacturing contracts, specialist cable-laying vessels, converter stations, and intergovernmental agreements. KX Power has demonstrated no expertise in HVDC transmission and has disclosed no contracts for such a project.

    The company’s core business — battery storage optimisation and grid services — is completely orthogonal to building a subsea power link across the Strait of Gibraltar. Its presence as Northern Pillar’s only named partner signals a limited technical and financial foundation for the project.

    Morocco’s Capacity: a Numbers Problem

    Morocco’s total renewable energy capacity at the end of 2025 was 4,851 MW, according to IRENA’s Renewable Capacity Statistics 2026. That is the entire installed renewable fleet of the kingdom: solar (1,086 MW), onshore wind (2,452 MW), hydropower (1,306 MW) and bioenergy (7 MW). Northern Pillar alone claims 4.2 GW — roughly 87% of Morocco’s entire current renewable capacity. By comparison, the NOOR Atlas programme currently under construction is adding only 225 MWp across four solar plants under MASEN.

    Morocco has achieved a renewable share of 39.6% of installed capacity, the highest in North Africa, but its priority remains domestic consumption, not large-scale export. The kingdom’s peak demand continues to grow, and its 814 MW of pumped hydro storage is designed to balance its own grid.

    The Morocco–Europe Connection: a Crowded Field

    Morocco already operates the only electricity interconnection between Africa and Europe — two 700 MW subsea cables across the Strait of Gibraltar, commissioned in 1997 and 2006, with bidirectional capacity of 1,400 MW . A third Morocco–Spain line, adding 700 MW, is planned for 2026 .

    Beyond Spain, several larger projects are at various stages of development:

    • Morocco–Portugal: In July 2026, the energy ministers of both countries formally agreed to build a 1 GW interconnection, estimated at €735–800 million. They will apply to the European Commission for funding and seek designation as a Project of Common European Interest (IPCEI).
    • Morocco–France: Mentioned in ONEE planning documents as a future connection, but no detailed project has been publicly presented. Xlinks is also reportedly exploring a French variant of its concept.
    • Morocco–Germany (Sila Atlantik): This is the most ambitious — and the most stalled. It is also, critically, the same developer as Xlinks. After the UK government withdrew support for the Morocco–UK cable in June 2025, Xlinks pivoted to Germany, launching a new vehicle called Sila Atlantik to keep the project alive.

    The Xlinks Precedent

    The comparison of Northern Pillar with Xlinks is unavoidable. Xlinks was a serious project: a 3.6 GW proposal to bring renewable energy from Morocco to the UK via 3,800 km of subsea cables, landing at Alverdiscott in Devon. It had secured 3.6 GW connection agreements with National Grid, had been designated a “project of National Significance” by the UK government, and had raised more than £100 million in development funding from investors including TotalEnergies, TAQA, Octopus Energy, and GE Vernova.

    Yet in June 2025, the UK government formally withdrew support. Energy Minister Michael Shanks stated that the scheme was “not in the UK national interest at this time” and “does not clearly align strategically with the government’s mission to build homegrown power here in the UK”. The government refused to grant a 25-year Contract for Difference (CfD) — a price guarantee that would have made the project financeable.

    Sir Dave Lewis, chair of Xlinks, said the company was “hugely surprised and bitterly disappointed”. But the decision was final. Xlinks is now exploring private off-takers — AI companies, cloud providers, data centres — as a fallback.

    The parallel with Northern Pillar is exact: without a government-backed price guarantee, a $30+ billion subsea cable project cannot attract the financing required to book cable manufacturing slots or secure specialist cable-laying vessels, which are already allocated years in advance.

    Northern Pillar’s Missing Architecture

    Northern Pillar lacks the elements that Xlinks spent years assembling:

    • No public agreement with MASEN. Morocco’s energy strategy is managed by the Moroccan Agency for Sustainable Energy. Xlinks had documented engagement; Northern Pillar’s website cites MASEN only as a source for Morocco’s renewable statistics, not as a project partner.
    • No land allocation in Morocco. A 4.2 GW solar complex would require thousands of hectares. The NOOR Ouarzazate complex, at 582 MW, is the world’s largest concentrated solar power plant and took years to develop. No such site has been identified for Northern Pillar.
    • No cable manufacturing or ship contracts. HVDC cable production and cable-laying vessels are booked years in advance. Xlinks had secured manufacturing slots; Northern Pillar has disclosed no such commitments.
    • No confirmed buyer. Gibraltar’s peak demand is approximately 80 MW. Taking 10% of a 4.2 GW cable would mean importing around 400 MW — five times the territory’s current peak consumption. The remaining 3.8 GW would need to be sold into European markets. There is no public evidence of agreements with Spain, the EU, or any corporate off-taker.

    A Timeline Fantasy

    Northern Pillar’s website states construction will begin in 2026. That would require contracts signed now, years before the industry’s manufacturing and installation capacity is available. Xlinks, with far more development work completed, was aiming for operations in the early 2030s.

    The reality of subsea HVDC infrastructure is that the supply chain is structurally constrained. Prysmian, Nexans and their peers have order books extending to the early 2030s. A project without advanced commitments to manufacturing slots and cable-laying vessels cannot begin construction in 2026 — regardless of how much capital it claims to be able to raise.

    Conclusion: a Narrative, Not a Project

    In previous articles we have examined Pelagos Data Centres from every angle — the constrained North Mole site, the marine-supported renders next to Waterport Terraces, the absence of a clear 20,000 sq m land plot, the proximity to the airport glide path and the residential blocks, the planning vacuum and the political scaffolding that currently holds the announcement together. Even if every one of those difficulties were somehow overcome, a more fundamental problem remains: where the power for Phases 2–5 is supposed to come from.

    The official story points to Northern Pillar Energy — a 4.2 GW solar-to-subsea-cable concept linking Morocco to Gibraltar. On the publicly available evidence that concept does not function. There is no disclosed consortium, no land allocation in Morocco, no agreement with MASEN, no cable manufacturing or vessel contracts, no confirmed offtakers for the surplus capacity, and a construction start date of 2026 that is incompatible with the realities of the HVDC supply chain. The only named industrial partner is a UK battery-storage developer whose actual business has nothing to do with intercontinental transmission. The precedent of Xlinks — a far more advanced project that still collapsed when government support was withdrawn — only sharpens the point.

    Pelagos may yet be built in some reduced form. But on current information it will not be powered by a cable from Morocco. Northern Pillar Energy is not a project. It is a narrative.

    Credits:

    1. Pelagos Data Centre: Built on Water https://ksokolovarchive.cc/2026/06/11/pelagos-data-centre-built-on-water/
    2. Pelagos Data Centre: The Three-Legged Stool https://ksokolovarchive.cc/2026/06/19/pelagos-data-centre-the-three-legged-stool/
    3. The Legal Architects: Hassans and the Inner Circle https://ksokolovarchive.cc/2026/06/25/the-legal-architects-hassans-and-the-inner-circle/
    4. PV Magazine (2025). UK rejects CfD bid for 10.5 GW Morocco solar-wind subsea cable. July 1, 2025. https://www.pv-magazine.com/2025/07/01/uk-rejects-cfd-bid-for-10-5-gw-morocco-solar-wind-subsea-cable/ 
    5. Energy Voice (2025). Xlinks ‘bitterly disappointed’ by Westminster rejection of Morocco-UK power project. June 25, 2025. https://www.energyvoice.com/renewables-energy-transition/575108/morocco-uk-power-project-rejected/ 
    6. HESPRESS English (2026). Morocco-Germany $30 billion undersea power project stalls over government guarantees. July 23, 2026. https://en.hespress.com/142509-morocco-germany-30-billion-undersea-power-project-stalls-over-government-guarantees.html 
    7. HESPRESS English (2026). Morocco-Germany $30 billion undersea power link stalled over project disagreements. July 22, 2026. https://en.hespress.com/142486-morocco-germany-30-billion-undersea-power-link-stalled-over-project-disagreements.html 
    8. Energy Partnership Morocco (2026). Sila Atlantik: New momentum for the direct electricity cable project between Morocco and Germany. February 9, 2026. https://energypartnership.ma/news/default-9d41ac044f0e3950b804b8ace12416ae/ 
    9. Portugal Resident (2026). Government prepares for energy interconnection with Morocco. July 21, 2026. https://www.portugalresident.com/government-prepares-for-energy-interconnection-with-morocco/ 
    10. AICEP Portugal Global (2026). Portugal, Morocco to Build Power Interconnection Project. July 21, 2026. https://portugalglobal.pt/en/news/2026/julho/portugal-morocco-to-build-power-interconnection-project/ 
    11. The New Arab (2025). Could Morocco’s green energy power half of Europe electricity?. September 26, 2025. https://www.newarab.com/news/could-morocco-supply-half-europes-energy-needs 
    12. London CIV (2023). BlackRock commits up to £200m to UK battery storage projects. https://londonciv.org.uk/news/blackrock-commits-up-to-ps200m-to-uk-battery-storage-projects 

  • How Halcon’s Portfolio Manager Is Linked to Dr. Zhe Zhang and Konstantin Sokolov

    August 06, 2026

    According to the pitch book for the Gotthard Investment Fund 2015 a Liechtenstein-based fund for professional investors (a critical update: the fund was subsequently liquidated in July 2020, with Ernst & Young approving its final closing balance sheet), managed by VP Fund Solutions AG – Konstantin Sokolov served as Vice Chairman and managing partner at Gotthard Investment AG in Switzerland, alongside his Swiss partner Roland Raeber. Together, they acted as Fund Managers of Gotthard Investment Fund / Gotthard Umbrella Fund signing off on all the fund’s transactions.

    Today, for an American citizen and a close associate of Donald Trump, direct affiliation with a European fund is no longer comme il faut. New projects require new partners and new instruments.

    In early 2024, we republished HETQ.AM’s investigation into the new owners of MTS Armenia. That investigation first revealed Sokolov’s new partner: the Chinese entrepreneur Zhe Zhang, and his connection to the management of Halcon Investment SICAV through SIFT Capital Partners Limited. That fund, in turn, controls AMIO Bank via the Cypriot company Elguma Investment Ltd. and Swiss MFM Global AG.

    ChatGPT generated group picture of Konstantin Sokolov, Dr. Zhe Zhang, and Michael Stockford.

    The Switch: SIFT out, Blue Water in

    In the publicly available reports for 2024 and 2025, SIFT Capital Partners Limited is no longer listed as the portfolio manager for Halcon Investment Fund. In its place: Blue Water Capital Management Limited.

    Did Zhe Zhang simply disappear? We think not. Blue Water Capital Management Limited, with its CEO Michael Stockford, is closely tied to Zhang – and, through him, to Sokolov.

    What did Blue Water do for Halcon Innovation Fund investors in 2025?

    The 2025 Halcon report includes a notification that the delegated portfolio manager changed its name from Redbridge Capital Management Limited to Blue Water Capital Management Limited.

    The fee structure is revealing. According to Halcon’s 2025 accounts, Blue Water’s total remuneration was HKD 7.237 million (≈ USD 928,000). Within that, the “Asset Management & Investment Advisory” fee specifically for the Halcon Innovation Fund was €305,729 – a reasonable and transparent charge.

    Blue Water also signed two major loan agreements in 2025 on behalf of Halcon: €13.7 million to MFM Global Invest AG (seemingly for the acquisition of a Swiss hotel) and €24.9 million to Remido Holdings Ltd – both entities connected to the wider Sokolov–Zhang ecosystem, as we previously covered.

    Effective 16 April 2026, the fund introduced two new unit classes as follows: HIF-EUR1M — for large institutional investors (minimum €1 million) — and HIF-DIRECT, a direct class for retail or qualified investors.

    Alongside these, the fund also adapted its Liquidity Management Tools to comply with new European regulations, which include a redemption-in-kind option.These changes may look like standard regulatory housekeeping. But they quietly give the manager new tools that can shift the rules of the game. New investors could find themselves locked into less favorable redemption terms, or — in the case of redemption-in-kind — receive assets instead of cash when they try to exit. In a fund already opaque and heavily invested in illiquid projects, this adds another layer of unpredictability for newcomers.

    What Blue Water Capital Management actually does

    According to its website, Blue Water works exclusively with Professional Investors as defined under Hong Kong’s Securities and Futures Ordinance (individuals with at least HKD 8 million – roughly USD 1 million – in securities). It holds SFC licences Type 4 (advising on securities) and Type 9 (asset management), registration BAU760, and operates under Hong Kong law.

    Blue Water does not manage the fund directly. It acts as a delegated portfolio manager. Its direct client is not the end-investor in Liechtenstein, but the fund’s management company – ONE Funds AG (registered in Liechtenstein). ONE Funds AG, as a licensed AIFM, hires Blue Water to manage the Halcon Innovation Fund portfolio. Crucially, Blue Water signs all decisions and contracts on behalf of the fund – a standard practice for such delegated structures.

    The Hatcher Group deal: Stockford and Zhang help Tanner consolidate control

    In early 2025, a deal on Hong Kong’s GEM exchange would have gone unnoticed – if not for its architecture. Hatcher Group Limited – a boutique consultancy specialising in taking Chinese mainland companies public – changed its controlling shareholder. Formally, through a standard rights issue. Informally, through a three-party operation where each participant played a distinct role.

    Hatcher Group is not a financial giant. It is a boutique firm with 100–150 employees, formerly known as VBG International Holdings. Its business: guiding mainland companies through the Hong Kong listing process – IPO advisory, M&A, corporate finance, ESG reporting. Listing was a pragmatic step, giving it access to public capital and strengthening client trust.

    That same public status made Hatcher Group a target.

    The buyer was Tanner Enterprises, controlled by Hong Kong businessman Li Man Keung Edwin. His goal: to increase his stake from 10.62% to a controlling position. The instrument: a rights issue with underwriting.

    Tanner agreed to buy any shares not taken up by existing shareholders. The risk was obvious: if the market didn’t support the deal, Tanner would get the company – but at a full price. If someone else tried to intercept the package, Tanner would get nothing.

    To rule out the second scenario, Michael Stockford was brought in – founder of Redbridge Capital Management Limited (later renamed Blue Water Capital). Stockford became an executive director of Hatcher Group on 1 October 2024. His companies served two roles: fund manager for the subscriber and placing agent for unsubscribed shares – at zero commission.

    The crucial element, however, was SIFT Capital Partners Limited – the Hong Kong asset manager founded by Zhe Zhang. SIFT subscribed to convertible bonds in Hatcher Group worth HKD 5.67 million, convertible into 18 million shares (up to 42% of the company). Formally, this was an independent transaction. In practice, it was a safety net.

    As long as SIFT held the bonds, any outsider eyeing control knew that Zhang could convert at any moment and dilute their stake. This wasn’t a blocker – it was a deterrent. And it worked in Tanner’s favour.

    When the rights issue closed, Tanner Enterprises had taken 65 million unsubscribed shares, raising its stake to 48.63%. Consolidation was complete. SIFT never converted – the bonds were never needed. Stockford stayed on the board, and his Redbridge soon rebranded to Blue Water Capital Management.

    Official documents from the Hong Kong Stock Exchange (HKEX) – the Hatcher Group Circular dated 10 January 2025 – neatly separate the participants: Zhang as the subscriber’s ultimate beneficial owner, Stockford as the owner of the management company, Tanner as the underwriter. There are no formal ties between them. But the logic of the deal suggests otherwise: three parties, synchronised in one process, with one goal – transferring control of a public company.

    Source: Hatcher Group Limited Circular, 10 January 2025 (HKEX). Page 43. The same document names Redbridge Capital Management (Michael Stockford) as the investment manager and Dr. Zhe Zhang (SIFT Capital Partners) as the ultimate beneficial owner of the CB Subscriber.”

    This is not collusion in the legal sense. It is a coordinated operation, where everyone knew their role. And the coincidences – the rebranding of Redbridge at the same time as the deal closed – are at the very least significant.

    After reading this brief account, one thing becomes clear: Blue Water Capital is far from a stranger to the shareholders of VIVA Armenia and AMIO Bank. It couldn’t be otherwise. The chain is consistent: Sokolov’s old Swiss structure, Zhang’s SIFT Capital, Stockford’s Blue Water – they all converge around the same assets. The rebranding, the appointments, the loans, the consolidation – all point to a stable, if informal, network operating across jurisdictions, from Liechtenstein to Hong Kong, via Cyprus and Armenia.

    Disclaimer & Forward-Looking Analysis: This article is for informational and educational purposes only and does not constitute legal, financial, or regulatory advice. All findings, linkages, and conclusions presented herein represent the authors’ analytical opinions, derived solely from the chronological correlation of verified dates, cross-border corporate filings, and publicly available disclosures from the Hong Kong Stock Exchange (HKEX) and the Liechtenstein Financial Market Authority (FMA). Unless explicitly cited from official regulatory documents, any inferences regarding parallel intent, nominee status, or informal networks are speculative hypotheses intended to stimulate public interest and independent analysis. This material does not accuse any mentioned individual or corporate entity of legal non-compliance, regulatory violations, or market collusion.