August 27, 2026
In our previous article, “Behind the █[REDACTED]█: Complete Publicly Available Decision on Permitting the KUPRAR RA and TEGHUT CJSC Concentration“, we reviewed the decision of the Commission for the Protection of Competition and Consumer Interests of the Republic of Armenia dated July 7, 2026, which permitted KUPRAR RA CJSC to acquire TEGHUT CJSC. After reading it, we concluded that the document reveals no concrete details about the actual substance of the transaction.
On July 1, 2026, Dmitry Pyanov, First Deputy Chairman of VTB Bank, gave an interview to the Russian state news agency Interfax, stating:
“— When and to whom will the copper mine in Armenia be sold? Will the group make a profit from the deal?
— In June 2026, the deal to sell 100% of VTB Bank’s claims against Teghut CJSC was closed. As a result of the transaction, the loan previously extended to Teghut from the balance sheet of our subsidiary bank in Armenia [VTB Bank (Armenia) CJSC] was also fully repaid. The buyer was a group of international investors. The financial result for the bank in 2026 from this transaction is positive, and the profit from exiting the asset, including income previously received in the first half of the year, will amount to approximately 4 billion rubles [∼ USD 51M].”
Thus we can be sure that the key financial settlement for the deal occurred a month before the SPA deal — in the period between June 8, 2026 (the date of Armenia’s parliamentary elections) and June 30, 2026 (before the interview was given on July 1, 2026). It was during this window that the buyer of the debt made the full cash settlement for the purchase of TEGHUT CJSC’s debt from VTB Bank.
Let us draw attention to the phrasing of First Deputy Chairman of VTB Bank: “profit from exiting the asset, including income previously received in the first half of the year.” This means that the $51 million includes, apparently, certain current income that VTB received from the mine in the first half of 2026. In 2024, Teghut’s revenue was $144 million (at an average annual exchange rate of ~390 AMD/USD). For half a year, this amounts to roughly $72 million — of course, salaries, taxes, and other operating expenses were paid out of this sum, so the bank’s actual “income” would have been lower. Nevertheless, the very fact of this inclusion does not allow us to treat the $51 million as purely profit from the sale of the debt — part of this sum had already been generated by the enterprise itself while it was under VTB’s control. Therefore, the exact price of the transaction remains unknown, and our preliminary estimate of $100–150 million still appears realistic.
This brings us to the central question that remains unanswered: which international bank was brave — or reckless — enough to facilitate a cash settlement of hundreds of millions of dollars with a sanctioned Russian bank, fully aware of the risks of secondary sanctions?
Media reports, led by Azatutyun (RFE/RL), have named Konstantin Sokolov — a US-based investor and head of TRIPP+ — as the architect and public face of the transaction. But as a US citizen or US-connected investor, Sokolov would have been acutely aware of the legal exposure involved in any transaction with a sanctioned entity like VTB. The question is not just who bought the debt — but which financial institution was willing to process the payment, knowing the consequences.
Did Sokolov personally take that risk? Or did he rely on a local intermediary — a “KUPRAR RA-2” with its own nominee beneficial owner, a “Virabyan-2” — to carry the operational burden while he remained the strategic frontman?
What we can say with confidence is that the debt was purchased by a separate entity, not KUPRAR RA. KUPRAR RA was a later construct, used to obtain legal title to the asset after the debt had already been cleared. That much is clear. But how the transaction was structured, who financed it, and who ultimately bore the financial and legal risk — these questions remain open, and are the subject of our ongoing thoughts.